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ABSTRACT 
 
We perform a comparative country-by-country study of companies going public in 
the six largest Continental European markets and Sweden during 1988 and 1998, a 
time period characterized by IPO activity in a broad set of industries. By applying a 
common research methodology, we find broad similarity in the overall and cross-
sectional initial pricing and long-run performance patterns. Positive long-run IPO 
performance is a function of a countries ability to attract New Economy IPOs. 
This helps to shed some light on the rational behind the frantic efforts made be 
individual European Stock Exchanges to establish New Market segments during 
the late 1990s.  
 
 
 
IN RECENT YEARS, A LARGE BODY OF LITERATURE has documented the 
returns on Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) earned by investors in Europe. For example, 
using a sample of 712 UK IPOs between 1985 and 1992, Espenlaub, Gregory and 
Tonks (1998) find that there are negative abnormal returns to a number of alternative 
benchmark portfolios. They conclude that there are negative abnormal returns from an 
IPO such that a one-pound investment is worth less than 85 pence after three years. 
Leleux and Muzyka (1998) analyse the performance of 307 IPOs in France, the UK, 
Germany, The Netherlands and Belgium, issued between 1987 and 1993. The authors 
find that European IPO shares exhibit the pattern of long-term underperformance 
highlighted in the US. Summarizing evidence from a large number of countries, 
Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994) report that underpricing, hot issue markets and 
long-run underperformance are global IPO phenomena.   
The evidence on IPO performance can also be addressed in a more general context 
of Why do companies go public? In this respect, Ellingsen and Rydqvist (1997) argue 
that companies tend to emphasize the following reasons for going public: (1) to obtain 
finance for growth opportunities, (2) to enhance a companys image and increase its 
publicity,1  (3) to motivate managers and other employees, and (4) to cash in by 
selling off the financial interest in the company. However, the more fundamental 
question is why firms go public to achieve these goals. For example, direct sales of 
stock and bank financing are alternative sources of funds that could potentially finance 
new projects or allow for transfer of ownership. Moreover, funds raised through stock 
market introduction are often very expensive. It is generally perceived that the total cost 
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1 When asked about the reasons for raising funds on the stock market, Nick Ogden, founder of Ogden, an 
UK-based Internet company, said the flotation will be as much about raising our profile as raising 
money. (Source: Sunday Business, March 12th 2000).  
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 of going public lies between 20 cents and 30 cents per dollar, depending on the size of 
the firm. The only reasonable explanation for the initial offer is that there are some 
further future benefits associated with going public that outweigh the high cost of doing 
so. In this context, Röell (1996) concludes that the reasons why firms pursue an IPO are   
due to an informative stock price, a more liquid stock, and increased competition 
among providers of finance.  
Our objective in this paper is to extend the evidence on IPOs by applying a common 
empirical research framework to companies that went public between 1988 and 1998 in 
the following seven individual European Countries: Germany, France, Italy, The 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. This period is of considerable importance 
as it begins with the aftermath of the 1987 stock market crash, followed by large 
privatization programmes and eventually by a big boom in European equity culture and 
issuing activity towards the late 1990s. These individual markets provide a unique 
opportunity to examine the robustness of findings on the performance of UK and US 
IPOs within the setting of other market-based financial systems, in which stock markets 
play an increasingly crucial role in company financing. Moreover, by extending our 
analysis of the European IPO market by studying each country individually, we can 
improve our understanding about the robustness of the IPO patterns reported in the 
literature and the homogeneity of the European IPO market. 
Some of our findings include the following: 
(1)     The underpricing phenomenon, while time-varying, is a consistent feature 
across all the countries in the study. There is tentative evidence to suggest that 
changes in tax regimes (in the case of Sweden and France), the regulatory 
framework (in the case of Spain) or the IPO mechanism (in the case of 
France) have had a significant impact on pricing and IPO activity. The results 
for the long-run performance of IPOs in individual European countries 
indicate that long-run underperformance is a time-varying phenomenon and 
sensitive to measurement technique and benchmark adjustment.  
(2)     Throughout the sample period, there appears to be a clearly positive link 
between the degree of a countries involvement in New Economy IPO 
activity and long-run IPO performance. While IPOs in Germany, The 
Netherlands or Sweden perform relatively well over the long-run, IPOs in 
countries with no New Economy IPO activity, such as Italy and Spain, fared 
worse. This can help to shed some light on the rationale behind major efforts 
made by stock exchanges across Europe to establish New Market segments 
during the 1990s. 
(3)     When performing significance tests of performance differences between the 
individual countries, the results, for overall and cross-sectional patterns, 
confirm similar initial and aftermarket performance of IPOs for each 
European country. This underlines the homogeneity of the European IPO 
market in general and the pervasiveness of the observed IPO patterns in 
particular.   
The structure of this study is as follows: Section I describes the institutional 
arrangements for IPOs in the seven countries under study and reviews the existing 
empirical literature. In Section II, we describe the data and methodology. Section III 
presents evidence regarding aftermarket performance and reports cross-sectional 
patterns in the performance of IPOs in the seven European countries. In Section IV, we 
check to see whether the results are robust across countries. Section V concludes with a 
summary and interpretation of the findings.  
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I.  Going public in European countries 1988-1998 
 
A.  Institutional arrangements 
 
In each of the seven countries under study, the regulations regarding an initial public 
offering (IPO) are set and maintained by the relevant exchange itself, with the consent 
of the Secretary of the Treasury, and must also be in accordance with legal guidelines 
that are set under the European Investment Services Directive.  
Before a firm can make an IPO, it must first obtain permission from the Ministry of 
Finance to have its shares listed on an exchange. The request for a listing must be made 
on the basis of a notice of introduction, whose contents are subject to detailed 
regulation and is generally filed 120 days before a company starts trading. In the case 
that the shares are listed, the professional association or government body acts as the 
regulatory agency. The issuing firm must also meet certain criteria such as providing 
annual accounts over a certain period of time, specifying the uses to which the proceeds 
of the offering will be put, and disclosing the shareholdings of the management and 
board of directors. Moreover, a chartered accountant must certify the firms annual 
accounts, and an offering prospectus must be submitted to the stock exchange by a 
member of the association, who sponsors the request. In the countries under study, a 
universal or an investment bank typically underwrites the IPO.2 The underwriter is not 
only involved in working out the registration statement, but is also responsible for 
managing the underwriting and floatation process.  
A company has, in principle, a choice between three market segments in which to 
list its shares: The Official Market, the Official Parallel Market or the New Market.3  
The choice of market segment is mainly based upon the minimum size of the issue. 
Moreover, while the minimum Public Float on the Official Market is at least 25 percent, 
no such requirements exist for shares seeking admission to the Official Parallel Market 
or the New Market. New Market segments, added since the mid-1990s to many 
European stock exchanges, cater exclusively to young, high-growth companies in 
technology-oriented market sectors. Lower requirements for companies listed on the 
New Market segments in terms of capital and operating history are offset by more 
stringent transparency and reporting rules after the IPO date. It must be stressed that the 
relevant authority has the right to waive certain listing requirements.4  While electronic 
trading of shares takes place in all market segments in France, Italy, Sweden and 
Switzerland, the main stock exchange operators in Germany, The Netherlands and 
Spain have maintained a hybrid system of floor-based and electronic trading.  
Firms that intend to go public have  at least in principle  a choice of which method 
their shares are offered to the public. A company can use one of the following methods 
to obtaining a listing and issuing equity: private placing, offer for sale by tender, 
                                                 
2 Particularly in Germany, companies seeking a listing have usually been engaged in a long-run 
relationship with its underwriter (Hausbankbeziehung).  
3 In the Appendix, Table AI, we summarize the main listing requirements that applied to the stock 
exchanges in the countries under study between 1988 and 1998. We do not cover companies going public 
in other market segments, such as the Unregulated Market or NASDAQ Europe (formerly EASDAQ).  
4 This is explicitly stated in the statutes of the Milan Stock Exchange. For companies going public in 
Sweden, because of the prevalence of dual-class shares, direct focus is given to the voting and ownership 
structure of companies going public. Here, the minimum number of shareholders necessary for floatation 
is explicitly stated.   
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 also referred to as bookbuilding, and offer for sale at a fixed price.5 In an offer for 
sale at a fixed price, the fixed price element is designed to widen the appeal of the 
issue for investors by eliminating price uncertainty. The prospectus states the number of 
shares being offered for sale and the price per share. Investors can then submit bids for 
the number of shares they wish to take up at the stated price. In offers for sale at a 
fixed price, while applications are invited from the general public, the issue is sub-
underwritten, at the same price, by a group of financial institutions. Once the price of 
the issue is fixed, it can neither be changed in response to emerging demand, nor 
withdrawn. With the possible exception of France, the majority of companies going 
public in the countries under observation went public through offers for sale at a fixed 
price until the mid-1990s. The major proclaimed disadvantage of an offer for sale by 
tender which uses bookbuilding procedure is that it cannot eliminate price 
uncertainty. However, with strong issuing activity and rising equity markets since 1995, 
during which companies, led by E Merck AG, a German pharmaceutical company, 
issued high volumes of shares, the bookbuilding method has been increasingly used as a 
means for going public as it allows the market itself  much more power in the issuance 
process.6  Since the mid-1990s, bookbuilding has become the pricing mechanism of 
choice for 70 percent of the IPOs in our sample. The inherent advantages of this 
procedure are that it seeks to assess market conditions before pricing, and that the final 
issue price is conditioned on market demand.  
The average total direct cost for a company going public in the sample varies 
between 5 percent and 7 percent.7  This fee structure has been relatively stable over year 
and country, despite growing competition for mandates between investment banks, and 
seems to exist irrespectively of type, nature and risk profile of the company. Using 
2,051 IPOs in 61 non-US markets between 1992 and 1999, Jenkinson, Ljungqvist and 
Wilhelm (2000) study whether the introduction of bookbuilding has increased the 
efficiency of IPOs. They find that  while the direct costs of bookbuilding are typically 
twice that for fixed-price offers  bookbuilding leads to substantially less underpricing.  
In general, the relevant stock exchange operators do not have any rules on how 
oversubscribed issues are to be allocated, beyond the general principle that the 
allocation must be done systematically.8  The degree and method of scaling down is 
entirely at the discretion of the issuing house and may involve any form or pattern that 
best suits the particular circumstances or interests of the company and its underwriter.9  
This may involve a ballot and/or scaling down of applications. In fact, the adopted 
method of allocation reflects the companys preference regarding the profile of its new 
shareholders, for example a large number of small individual investors versus 
institutional investors. Reimer (1998) discusses hot German IPOs where institutional 
                                                 
5 We do not discuss Private Placements in detail because they apply to low volume issues only. Derrien 
and Womack (1998) and Biais and Faugeron-Crouzet (2002) discuss other IPO mechanism unique to the 
French market.  
6 Reuters News Service, (December 27, 1995): German IPO pace to slow but demand still strong. 
7 Kaserer and Kraft (2000) provide a detailed study of floatation costs in Germany. Chen and Ritter 
(1999) document that in the US, at least 90 percent of deals that raised between 20 and 80 million Dollars 
have underwriting spreads exactly equal to 7 percent, and relate this to the lack of competition between 
investment bankers.  
8 Oversubscription is a common feature for the IPOs under study. In Germany and The Netherlands, for 
example, oversubscription has been fuelled by the fact that there is no pre-payment for IPOs. Payment for 
the shares is made after the allocation of the bids is announced and trading starts.  
9 The fairness of the allocation mechanism has been subject to constant public debate and increasing 
regulatory scrutiny. See Forbes, (June 22, 1992), pp. 156-162, or Wall Street Journal Europe, (June 15, 
1994): Investors in US Question Access to IPOs, raising issue of Fairness, or Reimer (1998).    
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 investors received a disproportionately large fraction of the shares on sale. This is 
consistent with the empirical findings by Cornelli and Goldreich (2001) who find that 
bidders who participate in many issues receive favourable treatment especially in the 
more successful (i.e. oversubscribed) issues. Furthermore, Ljungqvist and Wilhelm 
(2002) document that the frequency of directed share programs (friends and family 
shares) increased dramatically between 1996 and 1999. 
 
B. Previous Literature  
 
The focus of the empirical literature on IPOs in Continental Europe and Scandinavia 
has shifted over time. While most of the studies in the early 1990s focus on the 
underpricing phenomenon and its theoretical foundations, the research has increasingly 
concentrated on the cross-sectional study of aftermarket performance with respect to 
unique aspects of each country under observation. This has also involved going beyond 
the analysis of time-series stock price data to include the evaluation of operating 
performance data, the types of earnings management around the IPO date, and aspects 
of finance and law.10    
 
B.1. Germany 
 
Stehle, Erhardt and Przyborowsky (1998) study the short- and long-run performance 
of a sample of 222 German IPOs between 1960 and 1995. The authors find statistically 
and economically significant underpricing of 15.7 percent. Using an equally-weighted 
market portfolio as a benchmark, they also find a statistically insignificant buy-and-hold 
performance of negative 5.0 percent over a 36-month time horizon. Moreover, they 
argue that, because IPO stocks are typically small- or medium-sized, market portfolios 
might not make ideal benchmarks in IPOs studies. According to the study, the results on 
long-term performance are fully in line with the efficient market hypothesis and the 
hypothesis of deliberate underpricing. Schuster (1996) focuses on the performance of 
126 German IPOs issued between 1988 and 1995. He finds significant short-run 
overperformance. Moreover, he finds variations in year-to-year performance, across 
industries and other issuing characteristics, with larger companies as well as those with 
lower initial returns faring the worst. Due to the high median age of 49 years, it is 
hypothesized that the German IPO market is more of an M&A market than a venture 
capital market, indicated by the fact that IPO proceeds flow into maturing and declining 
industries, rather than those that are growing and dynamic. Other studies for the German 
IPO market include Ljungqvist (1997), Uhlir (1989) and Weinberger (1995) who 
reported evidence concerning underpricing and long-term performance.  
 
B.2. France 
 
Derrien and Womack (2002) focus on the efficiency of the main procedures of going 
public in France under different market conditions and mechanisms: a bookbuilding 
mechanism similar to the one used in the US, a fixed-price procedure and an auction-
like procedure. They show that overall market momentum in the three months prior to 
an offering is a significant ex ante predictor of the level of underpricing. In the sample 
of 264 French IPOs that went public on the French Official Parallel Market and New 
                                                 
10 Using inferences from individual country studies to make general statements about patterns in the 
European IPO market is difficult because of varying empirical methodologies, different sample sizes, 
measurement periods and the quality of data.  
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 Market between 1992 and 1998, mean underpricing reached 13.2 percent. After 
controlling for issuer and industry specific factors, they also find that the auction 
mechanism is associated with less underpricing and lower variance of underpricing. 
Using Cumulated Average Returns (CARs) starting from the eleventh trading day, they 
find insignificant average adjusted underperformance of negative 6.2 percent for the 
sample over a two-year horizon.  More generally, their work provides empirical support 
for the theoretical work of Biais, Bossaerts & Rochet (2002), who find that an IPO 
mechanism similar to Frances auction-like Offre à Prix Minimum (OPM) is optimal.11  
Faugeron-Crouzet, Ginglinger and Vijayraghavan (2001) focus on the relationship 
between the initial underpricing and the subsequent recourse to the capital market for a 
sample 288 firms that made an IPO on the French Official Parallel Market between 
1983 and 1994. While they find positive initial returns of 18.7 percent for the sample as 
a whole, they also find that firms which are more undervalued tend to subsequently 
issue shares, while firms which are not as undervalued tend to subsequently issue other 
kinds of hybrid security. Degeorge and Derrien (2000) examine the long-run stock price 
performance and earnings forecasts at the time of the IPO using a sample of 243 French 
IPOs that went public on the Official Parallel and New Market between 1991 and 1998. 
Using a variety of benchmarks and calculation methods, they show that IPOs performed 
normally over a two-year horizon. They also find that the best proxy for investors 
expectations is the average forecast issued by financial analysts unaffiliated with the 
underwriter taking the company public.  
 
B.3. Italy 
 
Giudici and Paleari (1999) conduct an empirical study of 135 IPOs on the Milan 
Stock Exchange between 1985 and 1998. Their analysis shows the existence of two 
periods characterized by different levels of underpricing. Between 1985 and 1993, the 
findings are consistent with the empirical results in other countries during this time, 
such as the negative correlation between underpricing and the firm size, a positive 
correlation between underpricing and the market trend and the price volatility in the 
aftermarket, and the fraction of the equity maintained by the controlling shareholders. In 
the second period between 1994 and 1998, underpricing is lower and the correlation is 
less significant, which, according to the authors, confirms the information gathering 
theory of Beneviste and Spindt (1989) and validates the importance of placing 
strategies. For the sample as a whole, they find average underpricing of 23.9 percent. 
Using buy-and-hold returns, Italian IPOs also underperform the broad market 
benchmark by 2.5 percent over three years. This work follows an earlier study done by 
Cherubini and Ratti (1992), who investigate the underpricing of a sample of 75 Italian 
companies that were introduced to the Milan main market between 1985 and 1991. 
They find average underpricing of 29.7 percent and postulate a positive correlation 
between oversubscription, issuing activity in the secondary market and the degree of 
underpricing. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 W.R. Hambrecht, a US investment bank, has recently used a similar procedure called OpenIPO for 
US IPOs. This procedure resulted in substantially less underpricing.   
 6
 B.4. The Netherlands 
 
Bosveld and Venneman (2000) analyse the investment and operating performance 
of a sample of 120 Dutch IPOs between 1983 and 1999 that went public on the three 
market segments of the Amsterdam Exchanges. They find highly significant average 
adjusted initial returns of 9.9 percent. The significance and magnitude of these returns, 
however, do vary widely over time. When calculated without outliers, it appears that the 
influence of the few extremely high returns is larger than that of the few extremely low 
returns. Furthermore, when using either of three benchmark adjustments, the authors do 
not find underperformance during the first three years of trading. Regardless of the 
benchmark choice, however, IPOs underperform the market after four or five years of 
trading. They find that, on average, for every Dutch Guilder (NLG) 100 invested in the 
benchmark, one would have had to invest NLG118 in the IPOs to obtain the same 
terminal wealth level after four years of trading, or even NLG124 to obtain the same 
terminal wealth level after five years of trading. They also show that Dutch IPOs are 
timed to coincide with periods of unusually good operating performance levels and find 
that the practise of window dressing is common prior to the IPO.  
Roosenboom, Van der Goot, and Mertens (2001) examine the relationship between 
two forms of earnings management and the fortunes of a sample of 80 IPO firms that 
went public on the Amsterdam Exchanges between 1984 and 1994. The result provides 
evidence that the form of earnings management during the IPO year can partially 
explain the cross-sectional variation in long-run stock price performance. Using buy-
and-hold returns, firms in which managers tend to overreport earnings during the IPO 
year subsequently perform poorly, and IPO firms in which managers smooth their 
income overperform their counterparts by a margin of more than 100 percent during a 
period of three years, adjusted for a number of different benchmarks. Van der Goot 
(1997) focuses on the quality of information by studying the offering prospectuses of 74 
IPOs on the Amsterdam Exchanges between 1983 and 1992. He finds that cash flow 
statements do not contribute to reducing information inequality between a firms 
management and its investors. Moreover, he stresses that valuation models based on 
Price-Earnings Ratios or Price-Book Ratios can only explain little of the observed 
variance in the issuing firms value. The author also points to a statistically significant 
negative relationship between firm value and the number of takeover defences 
introduced by a firm.  
 
B.5. Spain 
 
Álvarez and Gonzáles (2001) provide a detailed analysis of the short- and long-run 
performance of 56 Spanish IPOs, including four foreign issues, on the Madrid Stock 
Exchange between 1987 and 1997.  The authors also investigate the influence of IPO 
prospectus information on the long-run returns of IPOs. For the sample of companies, 
they report a highly significant unadjusted underpricing of 12.3 percent. With event 
windows of three and five years, they report mixed results for long-run performance. 
The magnitude of abnormal returns depends on the methodology, the weighting method 
and the benchmark used for the adjustment of IPO returns. While long-run 
underperformance is present when calculating buy-and-hold returns, it is not present 
when using other methodologies for returns measurement, such as calendar time returns 
or the Fama-French three factor model. Long-run underperformance is also 
concentrated in small firms. Moreover, none but two of the issuing characteristics of the 
offer are related to the behaviour of the stock price over three to five years. They find a 
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 positive relationship between initial underpricing, long-run performance and the 
percentage of shares retained confirming the signaling hypothesis. In a similar work, 
Olcoz and Feldsztaijn (2000) report 10.6 percent initial underpricing of a sample of 99 
IPOs in the Madrid and Barcelona Stock Exchanges between 1986 and 1998. This 
sample also underperformed the Madrid Stock Exchanges General Index (IGBM) by 
29.0 percent over three years. Companies with the highest Return on Equity (ROE) at 
the time of going public tend to be the best performers in the long-run. Rahnema, 
Fernández, and Martínez Abascal (1992) examine the short- and long-run performance 
of 85 Spanish IPOs over the period 1985-1990. Here, Spanish IPOs experience, on 
average, 10.8 percent underpricing. Handsome returns may be earned by investing in 
new issues, but the authors recommend liquidating within the first 90 days after the first 
market price.  In addition, they argue that it is possible to reduce the degree of 
underpricing by selecting the optimal timing, underwriter, and type of placement.   
 
B.6. Sweden 
 
Rydqvist (1993, 1997) documents IPO underpricing from the perspective of 
companies going public in Sweden. In his sample, composed of 224 new firms and 84 
equity carve-outs during 1970-1991, average underpricing reached 39 percent. He 
stresses the uniqueness of the Swedish IPO market: The significant difference in 
marginal tax rates between salary increases (85 percent marginal tax) and capital gains 
(20 percent marginal tax) led firms to allocate a significant portion of the offer to firm 
employees and key decision makers of the firms creditors, suppliers and customers. 
Therefore, underpricing was driven by an incentive to replace salary increases with tax-
efficient capital gains. The tax motivation for underpricing disappeared when a new tax 
code was introduced in 1990. This led to a subsequent drop in underpricing. In a similar 
analysis of IPOs between 1970 and 1991, Högholm (1994) finds a positive relationship 
between the level of underpricing and the level of ex-ante uncertainty surrounding the 
IPO. Firms belonging to the service sector seem to underprice their IPOs more than 
other firms. He also finds different levels of underpricing depending on the motive for 
going public. Using a sample of 162 Swedish IPOs between 1980 and 1990, Loughran, 
Ritter and Rydqvist (1994) find initial returns of 38.2 percent and a market-adjusted 
three-year return of 1.2 percent.   
A different line of research provides a legal and financial commentary of Swedish 
IPOs. Holmén and Högfeldt (2000) study how a legal regime, that provides weak 
minority protection and allows for the separation of votes from capital, affects behavior 
at the time of and after the IPO. They study 229 Swedish IPOs (excluding equity-carve-
outs and spin-offs) between 1979 and 1997, when close to 90 percent of all privately 
controlled Swedish IPOs used dual-class shares and issued only low-voting B-shares. 
They find that private owners who place much emphasis on being in control design the 
corporate charter and the initial ownership structure to maintain control after the IPO. 
Five years after the IPO, the original private owners of the companies in their sample 
retained 2/3 of the votes and 44 percent of the capital.  Moreover, if the firm has dual-
class shares, the controlling owner has a stronger incentive to invest and acquire other 
firms in stock financed takeovers since the owner only contributes a smaller fraction of 
the capital but exclusively enjoys all control rights of the larger firms.  Furthermore, 
they find that private owners in control firms that later undertake seasoned equity 
offerings retain a significantly higher proportion of votes and capital at the IPO date 
compared to other privately controlled firms. According to the authors, differences in 
ownership concentration, investment behavior and takeover frequency between 
 8
 Continental European/Scandinavian and the Anlgo-Saxon countries are, to a large 
extent, determined by endogenously established differences in security design and 
initial ownership structure at the IPO date that reflect differences in legal regimes.  
 
B.7. Switzerland 
 
Kunz and Aggarwal (1994) study underpricing of a sample of 42 IPOs that were 
issued in Switzerland between 1983 and 1989. They find a 35.8 percent average initial 
return between the offering price and the closing price on the first day of trading for 42 
Swiss IPOs. No long-run underperformance in the aftermarket is observed. The average 
excess returns remain well above 30 percent up to three years after the IPO. The authors 
point to a decrease of underpricing over time, indicating growing competition between 
investment banks. They also argue that companies may intentionally underprice their 
stocks in order to invest into their reputation by getting free publicity. Moreover, they 
find that the reserved disclosure policy of Swiss companies and the traditionally close 
ties between issuer and underwriter, may possibly explain the high average underpricing 
in Switzerland as compared to other countries.   
 
 
II. Data and Methodology 
 
A. Data 
 
The data was hand-collected in two phases. First, we identified the IPOs and a 
number of offering characteristics. These data include full name of the offering 
company, nationality, date and place of the offering, total number of shares issued, the 
percentage of equity offered (adjusted for overalottment options exercised), issue price, 
industry group and the year of foundation. Offering characteristics were identified from 
annual issuing statistics provided by the relevant national stock exchange operators or 
regulating agency, professional publications and newspapers and, if necessary, by 
contacting the issuing company. Second, we collected daily closing prices from the 
national stock market operators (in the case of France, Italy and Spain), from an 
academic institution (in the case for part of the German data) and from Datastream (in 
the case of The Netherlands, Switzerland and Sweden). Time-series data for the 
benchmarks and GDP deflators were taken from Datastream. For our classification into 
sectors, we use the Dow Jones STOXX classification scheme.    
Our final sample is comprised of 973 companies which conducted an IPO of 
common and/or preferred stock on one of the three main market segments of the main 
national stock exchange operator in Germany (219 companies), France (323), Italy (77), 
The Netherlands (75), Spain (88), Sweden (148) and Switzerland (43). We excluded   
foreign listings, Real Estate Investment Trusts, demutualizations  and  companies, 
which  transferred  from  one  market  segment to another. Based on our original 
records, the  sample  represents  at  least 90 percent of IPO activity in the countries 
under  study during   the   time  period   studied. Because of  our intention  to   provide  
a  comparative  country-by-country  study, we  calculate  returns  in local currency 
using a local trading day calendar. In  the cross-sectional analysis, we report aftermarket  
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Figure 1: continued 
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Figure 1. IPO activity and Stock Market Returns in European Countries. IPO proceeds 
are measured in 1998 purchasing power and defined as the number of shares offered to the public times 
the final offering price and include overalottment options, if applicable. The Initial Return is defined as 
the change from the IPO price to the closing price at the end of the first day of trading. The annual stock 
market return is defined as the annual change in the national stock market in the country under study. The 
following indices (all value-weighted) were used as a proxy for the respective national stock market:  the 
FAZ Index for Germany, the SBF 250 Index for the France, the MIB Historical Index for Italy, the CBS 
Index for The Netherlands, the Madrid General Index for Spain, the Affärsvärlden General Index for 
Sweden and the Swiss Total Market Index for Switzerland. 
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 performance categorized by initial return, age, size, percentage of equity offered, time 
period of offering and sector. 
Figure 1 shows that the number and value of IPOs was unevenly distributed across 
the sample period in each country under study. It underlines that the sample consists of 
stocks issued in both high activity and low activity markets, in which the underlying 
momentum in the general level of the stock market is positive. In this respect the sample 
is consistent with most of the empirical studies in the literature. Figure 1 also underlines 
the link between IPO activity and general level of the stock market.12   
Table I summarizes the IPO sample characteristics for the individual European 
countries. The size of the public float (in percent) is relatively uniform across countries. 
It is also consistent with findings by Espenlaub and Tonks (1998), who report that for a 
sample of 428 IPOs of UK incorporated, non-financial companies issued during 1986-
1991, the average proportion of equity sold was 29.49 percent. Initially, IPOs came 
from a variety of industries and were carried out by larger and older firms. This 
coincides with the evidence provided by Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994) who 
show that in Continental Europe, most of the firms that enter the market are more 
mature, larger and more established than their counterparts in the US. However, average 
age and number of industries represented has declined during the sample period. This is 
not surprising considering the large number of service- and technology-related IPOs in 
the German, French and Swedish market segments since the mid-1990s, combined with 
the rapid rise in equity ownership and financial integration in Continental Europe 
toward the late 1990s.    
 
 
 
Table I 
Sample Characteristics 
Characteristics of IPOs in European countries between 1988 and 1998. Age of the issuing firm is 
measured as the calendar year of going public minus the calendar year of foundation, with firms founded 
before 1901 assumed to be founded in 1901. Public Float is the percentage of equity offered. Firm Size 
(expressed in local currency units), is the total number of shares issued times the final offer price. Gross 
Proceeds are in local currency units and defined as the number of shares placed multiplied by the offer 
price and include overalottment options (greenshoe), where applicable. All values are expressed in end-
1998 prices using the monthly consumer price indices relating to each country. Market Sectors is a proxy 
for the diversity of the IPO market and represents the number of market sectors present out all 18 market 
sectors defined in the attached Dow Jones STOXX global classification standard.  
 Age, Public Float, Firm Size, Gross Proceeds, Market 
 years Percentage millions/billions millions/billions Sectors 
   Country Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Number 
Germany 35 23 38 33 803.5 192.6 250.4 71.8 17 
France 21 13 21 18 1,966.9 250.9 568.1 47.2 18 
Italy 25 19 32 29 1,674.0 235.3 404.9 71.9 17 
Netherlands 31 18 39 33 1,504.9 290.0 552.6 92.9 15 
Spain 38 31 40 38 60.6 21.4 19.1 8.1 16 
Sweden 25 14 39 33 1,207.2 337.0 512.2 93.9 15 
Switzerland 30 27 65 59 678.7 158.1 428.4 95.1 12 
 
                                                 
12 Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994) provide evidence that companies successfully time their 
offerings for periods when valuations are high, with investors receiving low returns in the long-run. 
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 Table II 
Sample Distribution 
Distribution of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) by country and year of issuance from 1988 to 1998, excluding demutualizations, investment companies and foreign issues. 
Equity carve-outs, spin-offs and privatizations are included.  Gross proceeds are in local currency units and defined as the number of shares placed multiplied by the offer 
price, and include overalottment options (greenshoe), where applicable. Aggregate gross proceeds are expressed in end-1998 prices using monthly consumer price indices of 
the respective country.   
Distribution of European IPOs by Country and Year of Issuance 
 Germany       France Italy Netherlands Spain Sweden Switzerland
 Aggregate  Aggregate  Aggregate  Aggregate Aggregate  Aggregate  Aggregate
Number Gross Number Gross Number Gross Number Gross Number Gross Number Gross Number Gross 
IPO     of Proceeds Of Proceeds  of Proceeds  Of Proceeds  of Proceeds of Proceeds of Proceeds
Year                IPOs DMm IPOs FRFm IPOs ITLbn IPOs NLGm IPOs ESPbn IPOs SKRm IPOs CHFm
1988               13 979.0 7 721.6 11 2,214.2 4 402.5 18 246.5 12 1,658.3 8 755.5
1989              22 2,534.2 20 13,493.9 7 2,415.3 10 4,843.3 19 309.8 6 2,480.5 1 191.3
1990             25 3,648.9 10 652.2 3 66.1 3 286.3 9 57.8 8 2,652.9 0 - 
1991               18 3,753.3 10 3,316.4 4 238.2 2 48.2 9 256.0 2 439.2 0 -
1992               8 709.3 4 1,551.5 2 2,083.5 3 1,485.2 3 73.8 2 143.9 1 158.1
1993              7 890.4 11 23,589.7 0 - 1 16.8 2 144.1 10 4,488.8 1 63.5
1994             10 1,218.9 35 19,674.2 3 8,095.7 5 8,783.5 4 72.7 27 18,782.9 3 269.4
1995             20 8,129.1 16 24,020.3 11 7,810.5 7 2,766.4 1 0.4 12 9,881.2 3 818.5
1996            9 20,854.7 47 5,810.6 12 3,324.3 7 4,209.0 5 75.2 8 21,267.2 6 1,031.4
1997             24 5,696.3 55 47,754.1 10 1,659.2 12 5,161.0 9 268.9 43 10,833.5 8 4,492.6
1998           63 6,413.8 108 42,923.4 14 3,269.7 21 13,442.5 9 177.3 18 3,175.8 12 10,640.9
     
Total          219 54,828.2 323 183,508.0 77 31,176.7 75 41,444.6 88 1,682.7 148 75,804.1 43 18,421.2
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 Table II presents the distribution of IPOs in Continental Europe and Sweden by year, 
both in terms of the number of IPOs and gross proceeds.  It shows that the number and 
value of IPOs were not evenly distributed over the sample period. While years 1988 to 
1990 were relatively high volume years in all countries under study, years between 
1991 and 1993 were years of low issuing activity. For example, during 1990 and 1991, 
there was no IPO activity in Switzerland, while Italy did not record any IPO activity in 
1993. Ahead of large privatization programmes, 1995 represented a year with high IPO 
activity, in terms of proceeds raised, size of companies and number of IPOs. Most of the 
issuing activity in Spain was concentrated in 1988 and 1989. This is partially 
attributable to the effect of the Spanish Securities Markets Law aimed at achieving 
greater penetration, transparency and liquidity. Moreover, while the strong increase of 
the number of listings in France was partly driven by the creation of the Nouveau 
Marché in 1996, it was also driven by a change in French tax law.13  In the other 
countries under study, there is no relevant legislation in place that would offer any 
incentive of a fiscal or financial nature to venture capitalists and venture capital 
companies similar to those in France. 
There were also some key institutional determinants of the emergence and growth of 
firms in Sweden. For example, a gradual deregulation of the capital markets during the 
sample period, a cut in corporate taxes and the deregulation of previously regulated 
markets have spurred-on entrepreneurial activity and stock market listings in Sweden 
since the mid-1990s. This came against the backdrop of traditionally high share 
ownership: around 60 percent of the Swedish adult population own shares. Davidsson 
and Henrekson (2000) identify some of the factors that have been particularly 
favourable for the emergence of Swedish firms, such as deregulation and fortuitous 
facts such as being a frontrunner in certain areas of technology, like telecommunications 
equipment manufacturing, for example.   
 
B. Methodology 
 
As reported earlier, the results of long-term performance studies are very sensitive to 
methodological choices. Here, we take this robustness issue seriously and present our 
results using a variety of methods. As in the previous chapter, we use an event-study 
methodology similar to Ritter (1991) for the evaluation of short- and long-run IPO 
performance. In this study, two measures of abnormal returns are computed for each 
country: First, cumulative average returns (CART) are calculated, defined as the average 
of cumulated benchmark-adjusted returns of individual stocks ( R ) using several 
different benchmarks: 
it
 
CART  = ∑∑
+=+=
T
1t
it
N
1i
R
N
1  
    
                                                 
13 Under French legislation, there are two primary venture capital vehicles: the Société de capital risque 
(SCR) and the Fonds commun de placement à risques (FCPR). In order to obtain certain tax benefits, 
these vehicles are required to invest at least 50 percent of their assets in qualifying non-quoted securities 
of EU companies. Moreover, when unquoted securities or shares which are eligible to be included in the 
50 percent limit upon acquisition by the SCR or FCPR and subsequently become listed on a regulated 
stock market, they continue to be included within such 50 percent limit during the five-year period 
following the IPO date. Under certain conditions, if a SCR or a FCPR acquires shares that are listed on 
the Nouveau Marché, these shares will be considered as non-quoted shares for the purpose of the 50 
percent quote. (Source: European Venture Capital Association).  
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 As an alternative to using cumulative-average returns, which implicitly assumes 
monthly portfolio rebalancing, we also compute adjusted and unadjusted three-year 
buy-and-hold returns: 
 
BHRT = 1)R1(N
1
it
N
1i
−+∑
+=
 
 
where  is the abnormal return in month t for firm i, with N firms in the sample. 
While there is greater knowledge about the properties of the distribution and the 
statistical tests for CARs, BHRs measure actual investors experience. For the evaluation 
of statistical significance of CAR
itR
T and BHRT, we use a simple cross-sectional t-test. 14  
To interpret the three-year buy-and-hold performance, we also compute wealth 
relatives (WR) as a performance measure. The wealth relative is the ratio of one plus the 
mean IPO three-year holding period return (not in percent) divided by one plus the 
mean benchmark three-year holding period return (not in percent), excluding the initial 
return. A wealth relative greater than 1.00 indicates outperformance and a wealth 
relative less than 1.00 indicates IPO underperformance. The initial return is the 
unadjusted change from the offering price to the first closing price and is defined as 
month 0.15 The aftermarket period includes the following 36 months, where one month 
is defined as a successive 21-day period using a local trading day calendar with returns 
denominated in local currency. For IPOs that are delisted before their third-year 
anniversary, the three-year buy-and-hold return ends with the last quoted price. To 
evaluate buy-and-hold returns of up to 36 months of trading, the sample had to be 
reduced to 677 issues. This is due to the large number of IPOs in 1998, that had not yet 
traded for three years as of February 2, 2001 (the cut-off date for this study).16  For the 
sample as a whole, only seven companies were delisted before their third-year 
anniversary. This is sharp contrast to Ritter (1991) who reports that out of a total sample 
of 1,526 US IPOs, 272 firms were delisted before their third-year anniversary on the 
stock market. 
Equally critical is the choice of benchmark. With the exception of Spain and Italy, 
returns for each individual country were adjusted using three different benchmarks: (1) 
a value weighted broad-market index, (2) a value weighted large-cap index, and a (3) 
value weighted small-cap or mid-cap index.17 We have calculated performance 
measures without explicitly adjusting for betas. For the US market, Ritter (1991), 
Ibbotson (1975), Chan and Lakonishok (1990) and Clarkson and Thompson (1990) 
report that average betas for IPO firms are greater than 1.00 and decline over time. They 
argue that the difference in betas between the IPOs and the benchmark is too small to 
have a significant effect on the conclusions.  Espenlaub, Gregory and Tonks (1998) 
apply a modified form of Ibbotsons (1975) RATS method to estimate the betas in their 
sample of 588 UK IPO firms between 1985 and 1995. Similar to US evidence, they find 
that the significance of the result of underperformance is likely to be understated rather 
                                                 
14  For a further discussion of statistical inference, see Brown and Warner (1980), Kothari and Warner  
(1997), Barber and Lyon (1997) and Loughran and Ritter (2000), for example.    
15 Adjusting initial returns for market movements does not change the qualitative nature of the results.  
16 This number (677) is slightly lower than the total number of companies used to evaluate three-year 
aftermarket performance in Schusters (2002) pan European IPO study (686 IPOs). In this paper, we used 
local trading days versus a European trading days (Schuster (2000)). Because of more public holidays, the 
local trading day calendar contains a smaller number of trading days per year in some countries.  
17 For Italy and Spain, no small- or mid-cap index was available covering the full length of the 
measurement period between 1988 and 2001.  
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 than over-stated and that it is unlikely that the magnitude of the results can be explained 
away by specification errors. In his sample of 80 Finnish IPOs between 1984 and 1989, 
Keloharju (1993) concludes that given the magnitude of the cross-sectional betas, it is 
unlikely that risk mismeasurement alone could account for the result of 
underperformance of Finish IPOs. For their sample of Dutch IPOs, Roosenboom, Van 
der Goot, and Mertens (2000) find a beta range between 0.55 and 1.16 over the first 36 
months of trading. Similarly, using a sample of 307 firms that went public in five 
European countries between 1983 and 1991, Leleux and Muzyka (1998) did not record 
betas in excess of 1.00.  
 
 
III. Performance Analysis of IPOs in European countries 
 
A.  Aftermarket Performance 
 
Table III reports initial returns and cumulative average returns (CARs) measured up 
to 36 months after the offering date using a broad-market benchmark for each individual 
country.  The results indicate the complexity of the IPO performance picture.  With the 
exception of Italy, Spain and Switzerland, IPOs experience positive aftermarket 
performance before the end of the first year of trading. Over the long-term, however, the 
picture changes dramatically. When assuming monthly portfolio rebalancing, IPOs in 
all countries record negative average adjusted returns at their third-year anniversary, 
with French, Italian and Spanish IPOs showing significant underperformance. With the 
exception of Sweden and Switzerland, the firms negative performance is reflected in a   
steady   decline   in   the   CARs   after   their oneyear anniversary on the stock market.  
In Figure 2, we have plotted three CAR series, where the initial return is also 
included. The individual benchmarks are main indices used in each country to describe 
either the state of the broad-market, the market for large-caps or the market for small- 
and mid-cap stocks. The distribution of initial returns varies across time and country, 
and is generally positively skewed. While the initial return picture is broadly similar, 
Figure 2 shows that the dynamics in aftermarket performance is not uniform across 
countries. For German and Dutch IPOs, positive initial returns are followed by months 
of strongly positive outperformance, until the relative performance picture changes 
quite dramatically after around six month of trading. The best overall performance 
picture emerges for Swedish IPOs that start to underperform relatively late. As 
inspection of Figure 1 shows, high Swedish IPO activity in technology- and service-
related firms in 1997 preceded the large wave in IPO activity in other European 
countries in 1998. Many of the Swedish IPOs reached their third-year anniversary by 
mid-2000, a time when the NASDAQ Index traded slightly off its highs reached in 
March 2000. The return picture for the Southern European countries of Italy and Spain 
is dismal. While both countries experience large initial returns, IPO performance starts 
to deteriorate early at least until the third-year anniversary. We also find that the 
performance of IPOs is sensitive to the benchmark employed. IPOs generally perform 
much better when adjusted for movements in small- or mid-cap indices and perform 
worse against large-cap indices. One reason why some small- and mid-cap indices 
match the IPO performance more closely is that index constituents are firms that have 
recently gone public. This issue is inherent in the countries under study due to a 
relatively small universe of listed companies.  
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 Table III 
Cumulative Average Returns (CARs) 
Aftermarket Returns are measured as Cumulative Average Returns (CARs), with associated Standard 
Errors (S.E.) (in parentheses) for the 36 months after going public, excluding the initial return. One month 
is defined as a consecutive 21-trading interval using local trading days. For each country, raw returns 
were adjusted for the following broad-market value-weighted benchmarks: German IPO returns were 
adjusted for the FAZ Index, French IPO returns for the SBF 250 Index, Italian IPO returns were adjusted 
for the MIB Historical Index, and the CBS Index, excluding Royal-Dutch, was the benchmark for the 
Dutch market. Spanish IPO returns were adjusted form movements in the Madrid General Market 
(IGBM) Index, the Affärsvärlden General Price (AFG) Index was used for the Swedish market, and the 
Swiss Total Market (STM) Index was the benchmark for the sample of Swiss IPOs. An adjustment for the 
relevant MSCI national indices does not change the results. Month 0 is the Initial Return interval.   
Panel A:  Germany 
Month of trading 0 1 6 12 18 24 30 36 
Number of firms 219 219 219 219 219 219 190 155 
CAR1, t 0.2566a 0.0208 0.1585a 0.1608a 0.1419b 0.1003 -0.1067 -0.1166 
S.E. (0.0334) (0.0159) (0.0417) (0.0531) (0.0700) (0.0725) (0.0739) (0.0852)
Panel B: France 
Month of trading 0 1 6 12 18 24 30 36 
Number of firms 323 323 323 323 321 315 284 213 
CAR1, t 0.1237a 0.0343a 0.0045 -0.0280 -0.0748 -0.0666 -0.2227a -0.1901a
S.E. (0.0104) (0.0121) (0.0232) (0.0339) (0.0475) (0.0529) (0.0553) (0.0715)
Panel C:  Italy 
Month of trading 0 1 6 12 18 24 30 36 
Number of firms 77 77 77 77 76 74 70 59 
CAR1, t 0.1303a -0.0454a -0.0376 -0.0903 -0.1198 -0.1783b -0.2596a -0.4185a
S.E. (0.0327) (0.0124) (0.0470) (0.0613) (0.0780) (0.0859) (0.0777) (0.0918)
Panel E:  The Netherlands 
Month of trading 0 1 6 12 18 24 30 36 
Number of firms 75 75 75 75 74 72 67 53 
CAR1, t 0.1346a 0.0163 0.0221 0.0018 -0.0981 -0.1103 -0.1297 -0.1558 
S.E. (0.0259) (0.0298) (0.0450) (0.0667) (0.0713) (0.0931) (0.1091) (0.1248)
Panel F:  Spain 
Month of trading 0 1 6 12 18 24 30 36 
Number of firms 88 88 88 87 87 87 80 68 
CAR1, t 0.1475a -0.0015 -0.0161 -0.0782b -0.1756a -0.2661a -0.3500a -0.3021a
S.E. (0.0260) (0.0154) (0.0303) (0.0388) (0.0495) (0.0688) (0.0761) (0.1667)
Panel G:  Sweden 
Month of trading 0 1 6 12 18 24 30 36 
Number of firms 148 148 147 146 141 132 119 99 
CAR1, t 0.1846a 0.0071 0.0295 0.0140 0.0418 0.0523 0.0493 -0.1270 
S.E. (0.0233) (0.0158) (0.0286) (0.0392) (0.0570) (0.0644) (0.0760) (0.0789)
Panel H: Switzerland 
Month of trading 0 1 6 12 18 24 30 36 
Number of firms 43 43 43 43 43 43 42 31 
CAR1, t 0.0971a -0.0217 -0.0226 -0.0646 -0.0485 -0.0446 -0.0502 -0.1817 
S.E. (0.0228) (0.0166) (0.0312) (0.0518) (0.0735) (0.0998) (0.1127) (0.1378)
a,b,c denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on a simple t-test.  
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 Figure 2. The Long-Run Performance of IPOs in European Countries. Cumulative 
average returns (CARs) for an equally-weighted portfolio of Initial Public Offerings in Germany, France, 
Italy, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland between 1988 and 1998, with monthly 
rebalancing, month 1 to 36. One month is defined as a consecutive 21-day trading interval using local 
trading days.  With the exception of Italy and Spain, four CAR series are plotted for each country for the 
36 months after the IPO date: 1) raw returns (no adjustment); 2) a broad-market value-weighted index 
adjustment; 3) a value-weighted large-cap index adjustment; and 4) a value-weighted small-cap or mid-
cap index adjustment. The FAZ Index (broad-market), the DAX 30 Index (large-caps) and the GSC100 
Index (small-caps) were used as benchmarks for the adjustment of raw German IPO returns. French IPO 
returns were adjusted for the SBF 250 Index (broad-market), the CAC40 Index (large-caps) and the 
AGEFI Second Market Index (small-caps). Because of a lack of a small-cap benchmark over the full 
measurement period, Italian IPO returns were adjusted for the following two benchmarks: the MIB 
Historical Index (broad-market) and the MIB 30 Index (large-caps). Dutch IPO returns were adjusted 
using the CBS Index, excluding Royal Dutch (broad-market), the EOE Index (large-caps) and the MKAP 
Index (small/mid-caps) as benchmarks. Due to a lack of benchmarks for small-cap stocks over the sample 
period, Spanish IPO returns were adjusted using the IGBM Index (broad-market) and the IBEX35 Index 
(large-caps). The Affärsvärlden General Index (broad-market), the OMX 30 Index (large-caps) and the 
James Capel Smaller Companies Index (small-caps) were used for the adjustment of raw Swedish IPO 
returns. Finally, Swiss IPO returns were adjusted for the Swiss Total Market Index (broad-market), the 
SBC 100 Index (large-caps) and the Swiss Small Cap Index (small-caps).  An adjustment for the set of 
Morgan Stanley country indices (MSCI) leads to similar results. Month 0 is the initial return interval. 
Returns were calculated on the basis of final closing prices.    
 
 
The reported results are generally in line with the existing empirical literature in the 
countries under study. Looking at the first 36 months of trading, underperformance 
across the individual countries does not, however, reach the degree of significance 
reported in Ritter (1991) who uses a much larger sample and matching firms as a 
benchmark for reporting abnormal returns.  
In Table IV, we show the distribution of unadjusted three-year buy-and-hold 
(BHRs) returns for the individual countries under study. Median IPO three-year returns 
are positive in only three countries: The Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland.  
Swedish IPOs performed best with a median three-year buy-and-hold return of 26.76 
percent. This is due to a large number of companies that recorded a positive 
performance in absolute terms as well as the existence of few extreme winners. The 
worst three-year median performance belongs to Spain and Germany.  Examination of 
Table IV underlines that three-year holding period return distributions are skewed 
across the countries with few extreme winners dominating the mean return picture.  The 
highest three-year total return of 8,900.0 percent, excluding the initial return of 4.4 
percent, belongs to EM.TV AG, a German   media   company   that   was    introduced 
in 1997 on the Neuer Markt as one of its first companies. This is followed by a three-
year unadjusted return of 6,823.1 percent recorded by Mobilcom AG, the first company 
on the Neuer Markt, which jumped 52.0 percent on its first day of trading. The best 
French performer was Eurofins Scientific SA with a 2,247.8 percent three-year buy-
and-hold return. Sylis SA, a 1997 IPO on the Second Marché, recorded a three-year raw 
return of 676.3 percent and an initial return of 14.3 percent. The best three-year 
performance of an Italian IPO belongs to Mediolanum SpA, an Italian Financial 
Services Company, with an unadjusted return of 346.5 percent, excluding the initial 
return of 30.8 percent. This is followed by Bulgari Spa, the international fashion and 
jewellery house that recorded an initial return of 5.7 percent and an unadjusted 
performance of 317.0 percent over three years. ASM Lithography NV, a 1995 IPO on 
the Amsterdam Exchanges, was the best Dutch performer. It returned 912.5 percent 
over three years, excluding the initial return of 22.6 percent.  The second best Dutch 
performer was Baan NV, a software company, with a three-year unadjusted
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 Table IV 
Distribution of unadjusted Three-Year Buy-And-Hold Returns 
Distribution of unadjusted three-year holding period returns, exclusive of the initial returns, for IPOs in European countries between 1988 and 1998. Returns are measured as 
three-year unadjusted buy-and-hold returns. One month is defined as a consecutive 21-day trading interval after the first closing price using local trading days. Prices are 
adjusted for dividends, stock splits and rights offerings.   
Three-year unadjusted holding period return 
Germany       France Italy The Netherlands Spain Sweden Switzerland
Rank IPOs       Rank IPOs Rank IPOs Rank IPOs Rank IPOs Rank IPOs Rank IPOs
1 (lowest)       -0.9123 1 (lowest) -0.9491 1 (lowest) -0.8748 1 (lowest) -0.9865 1 (lowest) -0.9948 1 (lowest) -0.9455 1 (lowest) -0.9865
10  -0.6418 14  -0.7914 4  -0.6790 4  -0.6548  5  -0.8766 6  -0.7250 2  -0.5312
19  -0.5890 27       -0.6962 7  -0.5891 7  -0.5537 9 -0.7784 12 -0.4293 4 -0.4872
29  -0.4378 40       -0.5372 11  -0.4609 10  -0.5346 13 -0.7213 19 -0.3333 6 -0.3306
39 (25th) -0.3853 53 (25th) -0.4193 15 (25th)       -0.2762 13 (25th) -0.3976 17 (25th) -0.6952 24 (25th) -0.2571 8 (25th) -0.2511
49  -0.3308 67  -0.3316 18  -0.2544 17  -0.2384  21  -0.6160 30  -0.2151 10  -0.1579
58  -0.2695 80       -0.1864 22  -0.1861 20  -0.1045 25 -0.5283 36 -0.1317 12 -0.1013
68  -0.1848 92   -0.1047 25  -0.1157 23  0.0000 30 -0.4264 42  0.0284 14  0.0245 
78 (median) -0.1323 107 (median) -0.0283 30 (median) -0.5700 26 (median) 0.0240 34 (median) -0.3621 49 (median) 0.2676 16 (median) 0.0812 
87  -0.0528 120  0.0855 34  0.0966 29  0.2285 38  -0.2867 55  0.4445 18  0.4200 
97  0.0657 133   0.1698 38  0.1478 32  0.4948 43 -0.2229 61  0.5625 20  0.9241 
106  0.3652 146   0.4124 42  0.2877 36  0.7243 47 -0.0690 66  0.6170 21  0.9533 
116 (75th) 0.6049 160 (75th) 0.8869 45 (75th)  0.3510 39 (75th) 1.0086 51 (75th) 0.0799 72 (75th) 0.8733 23 (75th) 1.0227 
126  0.7535 173  1.2511 48  0.6507 42  1.3438 55  0.2175 79  1.3151 25  1.2810 
136  1.1216 187   1.7708 52  0.8801 46  2.0831 60 0.6593 86  1.6540 27  1.4113 
146  2.0478 200   2.3948 56  1.6319 49  2.9176 64 1.1939 92  3.6296 29  2.2388 
155 (highest)  89.0000 213 (highest) 22.4783 59 (highest) 3.4651 53 (highest) 9.1250 68 (highest) 7.8378 99 (highest) 10.1489 31 (highest) 4.2268 
All           (Mean) 1.3892 All (Mean) 0.5369 All (Mean) 0.1794 All (Mean) 0.7369 All (Mean) -0.0465 All (Mean) 0.7290 All (Mean) 0.5595
Ex. Top 1% 0.1754 Ex. Top 1% 0.3319 Ex. Top 1% 0.1190 Ex. Top 1% 0.5756 Ex. Top 1% -0.1642 Ex. Top 1% 0.6329 Ex. Top 1% 0.4373 
Ex. Top 10% -0.0314 Ex. Top 10% 0.0584 Ex. Top 10% -0.0581 Ex. Top 10% 0.2067 Ex. Top 10% -0.3501 Ex. Top 10% 0.2195 Ex. Top 10% 0.2937 
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 buy-and-hold return of 826.8 percent, excluding the initial return of 55.0 percent. 
Among the best of the Spanish performers was Tele Pizza SA, a Pizza home delivery 
service, with a three-year buy-and-hold return of 394.6 percent, excluding its initial 
return of 34.8 percent. Moreover, Compañía Vinícola del Norte de España SA, a 
Spanish Wine producer, had a first day return of 28.5 percent and a three-year raw 
performance of 119.4 percent. In Sweden, LGP Telecom AB, a technology company 
going public in June 1997 on the OTC list of the OM Stockholm Exchanges, ranked 
highest with an unadjusted return of 1,014.9 percent, excluding its initial return of 8.5 
percent. Sigma AB, a technology company, ranked second highest, recording an 
unadjusted three-year buy-and-hold return of 962.8 percent, excluding the initial return 
of 62.3 percent. In the sample of Swiss IPOs, there were several IPOs that had triple-
digit investment gains in the three years after their IPO. Clariant AG, a chemicals 
company, rose by 422.68 percent since its 1995 IPO, excluding the initial return of 0.7 
percent. Moreover, Phoenix Mecano AG, an IPO on the Swiss market in September 
1988, recorded an unadjusted return of 265.7 percent, excluding the initial return of 5.7 
percent.  
 
B.  Cross-Sectional Performance Patterns   
 
This section documents cross-sectional patterns in the aftermarket performance of 
IPOs. We perform this analysis for each individual country under study by segmenting 
the sample by a number of cross-sectional characteristics such as IPO year, sector, age, 
size, public float and initial return category. For each country, we conduct the analysis 
for initial and aftermarket returns. This permits examination as to whether initial and 
aftermarket performance are related to the issuing characteristics of the offer and allows 
for a more detailed look at IPO performance in general and pan-European IPO 
performance in particular. 
As shown in Figure 2, the quantitative measurement of long-run IPO performance is 
sensitive to the benchmark employed. For evaluating the long-run performance of the 
IPOs in the sample, it is not at all clear what constitutes the appropriate benchmark 
portfolio. As mentioned earlier, the use of small- or mid-cap indices as benchmarks may 
bias the results in favour of finding no abnormal market-adjusted returns. Throughout 
the rest of the paper, we will therefore adjust IPO returns for movements in the broad-
market value-weighted indices. While not capturing the complete picture of the market 
for small- and medium-sized stocks, broad-market indices also include large offerings 
similar to mature IPOs, privatization issues and equity carve-outs. We will also focus on 
reporting three-year wealth relatives (WR) as the primary measure of IPO aftermarket 
performance. 
 
B.1. Germany 
 
In Table V, we present evidence concerning the initial (Panel A) and long-run 
performance (Panel B) for the sample of German IPOs as a whole, and characterised 
according to a number of cross-sectional characteristics. Underpricing is a cyclical but 
consistent feature throughout the sample period and confirms the positive link between 
initial returns and the general level of the stock market. Only 4.57 percent of the IPOs in 
the sample experienced negative unadjusted initial returns. We also find that, when 
using buy-and-hold returns, average long-run returns for German IPOs were positive. 
This positive performance, however, is due to IPOs issued between 1995 and 1998. 
IPOs issued in cold markets during the early 1990s significantly underperform the 
market. For example, a strategy of  investing  in  all  IPOs  issued during 1991 and 1994  
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 Table V 
Initial Returns and the Long-Run Performance of German IPOs 
Descriptive statistics for the initial and long-run performance of German IPOs, categorized by IPO year, 
sector, age, size, public float (%) and initial return (%). New Economy firms belong to Market Sectors 5, 
13, 16 and 17, representing Technology, Media, Telecommunication and Healthcare, respectively, in the 
attached Dow Jones STOXX global sector classification standard. Old Economy firms belong to all other 
sectors. Age is the year of going public minus the year of foundation, with firms founded before 1901 
assumed to be founded in 1901. Size/Market Capitalization in DM millions is the number of shares 
issued times the final offer price (expressed in constant end-1998 prices). The initial return is the 
difference between the final offering price and the first-day closing price.  Long-run returns are measured 
as mean three-year buy-and-hold returns (ex. the initial return) whereas three-years is defined as 36 
consecutive 21-day trading intervals after the first close using local trading days. For example, for the 
oldest age category, the Wealth Relative of 0.756 is computed as 1.0311/1.3645.  
Panel A: Initial Returns 
Category  N    Mean Median  Standard Deviation S.E. 
Percentage 
negative 
IPO year 1988-1990 60 0.1209a 0.0547 0.23 (0.0296) 3.33 
IPO year 1991-1994 43 0.0366a 0.0122 0.05 (0.0083) 3.17
IPO year 1995-1998 116 0.4083a 0.1250 0.62 (0.0574) 6.25
New Economy 57 0.5743a 0.1935 0.72 (0.0957) 1.75 
Old Economy 162 0.1448a 0.0443 0.32 (0.0248) 5.56
Age < 15 87 0.4252a 0.1290 0.65 (0.0694) 4.60 
15 ≤  Age < 37 51 0.2531a 0.0606 0.46 (0.0647) 5.88
Age ≥  37 81 0.0776a 0.0421 0.13 (0.0142) 3.70
Small firms  (<100m) 112 0.3174a 0.0730 0.58 (0.0545) 2.27 
Medium firms (100-500m) 81 0.2287a 0.0607 0.43 (0.0475) 5.65
Large firms  (>500m) 26 0.0816a 0.0695 0.09 (0.0168) 3.92
Public Float < 20 25 0.2463a 0.0920 0.36 (0.0720) 0.00 
20 ≤  Public Float < 30 64 0.2804a 0.1250 0.44 (0.0544) 1.56
30 ≤  Public Float < 50 83 0.2976a 0.0526 0.61 (0.0672) 6.02
Public Float  ≥  50 47 0.1571a 0.0444 0.38 (0.0551) 8.51
All IPOs 219 0.2566a 0.0667 0.49 (0.0334) 4.57 
Panel B:  Long-Run Performance  
Category  N  IPO return FAZ Index return  
Wealth 
Relative S.E. 
Percentage 
negative 
IPO year 1988-1990 60 0.0157 0.0582 0.960 (0.0802) 65.00 
IPO year 1991-1994 42 -0.0799 0.3139 0.700a (0.0747) 76.19
IPO year 1995-1998 53 4.1083 0.8675 2.735 (2.1182) 66.04
New Economy 26 6.7516 0.4648 5.292 (4.1912) 50.00 
Old Economy 129 0.3084 0.3920 0.940 (0.1817) 72.09
Age < 15 46 4.5868 0.5210 3.673c (2.4201) 58.70 
15 ≤  Age < 37 32 0.0605 0.3319 0.796b (0.1299) 59.38
Age ≥  37 77 0.0311 0.3645 0.756a (0.0699) 77.92
Small firms  (<100m) 32 3.1279 0.3612 3.032 (2.7667) 65.63 
Medium firms (100-500m) 82 1.1093 0.4013 1.505 (0.8530) 71.95
Large firms  (>500m) 41 0.5920 0.4437 1.103 (0.3296) 63.41
Public Float < 20  19 4.1598 0.5125 3.411 (3.5411) 63.16 
20 ≤  Public Float < 30 43 0.4220 0.3193 1.078 (0.3112) 67.44
30 ≤  Public Float < 50 60 1.8751 0.3504 2.129 (1.5096) 63.33
Public Float  ≥  50 33 0.1709 0.5503 0.755b (0.1815) 81.82
Initial Return  ≤  0  22 -0.0840 0.3982 0.655a (0.1422) 90.91 
0 <  Initial Return < 7 69 1.4573 0.3955 1.761 (1.2793) 63.77
7 ≤  Initial Return < 20 43 0.4995 0.4396 1.042 (0.3153) 67.44
Initial Return  ≥  20 21 4.5306 0.3667 4.047 (3.2787) 61.90
All IPOs (Mean) 155 1.3892 0.4042 1.701 (0.7296) 68.39 
All IPOs (Median) 155 0.728  
a,b,c denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on a simple t-test.  
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 would have left the investor with only Deutsche Mark (DM) 0.700 relative to each DM 
invested in the FAZ Index. The underperformance is concentrated in older companies 
that also exhibit the lower initial returns. Companies in the New Economy, companies 
with a small public float and companies with higher initial returns perform substantially 
better. The findings in Table V also confirm that the median picture is substantially 
worse than the mean picture. In our sample, 68.39 percent of the companies 
underperformed the market with a median wealth relative of 0.728.  
 
B.2. France 
 
In Table VI, we summarize the findings on initial and aftermarket performance for 
the sample of French IPOs. There is significant underpricing, which, however, is less 
cyclical and lower than in some other countries. This may serve to highlight the 
efficiency of auction-like IPO mechanisms prevalent in France. Only 6.50 percent of 
companies had negative first -day initial returns. Contrary to Germany, IPOs issued in 
France between 1991 and 1994 overperformed the market. There is also significant 
long-term underperformance in Old Economy stocks that make up 70 percent of the 
sample. While the long-run average performance is negative, it is not statistically 
significant when assuming conventional measures of significance. The data also 
confirms a tendency for older companies and companies with a large public float to 
underperform the market and their younger counterparts in the long-run. 67.61 percent 
of IPOs in the sample underperformed the market, a value similar to one reported for 
Germany. A strategy of investing in the median French IPO at the end of the first day of 
trading, and holding it over 36 months, would have left the investor with only French 
Franc (FRF) 0.631 relative to each FRF invested in the SBF 250 Index.  
 
B.3. Italy 
 
Evidence on the performance of Italian IPOs is summarized in Table VII. Here, the 
following inferences can be drawn: First, Italian IPOs are underpriced on average by 
13.03 percent. Underpricing, however, is less significant and more time-varying than for 
any other country in this study. Indeed, 20.78 percent of Italian IPOs had negative initial 
returns. Second, only seven percent of the companies under study were New Economy 
companies, a finding that offers a key insight about the composition of the Italian IPO 
market during the sample period. Moreover, our results also clearly confirm findings by 
Giudici and Paleari (1999) who distinguish two separate periods in which aftermarket 
performance varies substantially: a period up to 1989, when IPOs significantly 
overperformed the broad-market benchmark, and the remaining period that was 
characterized by strong underperformance. In our sample, the percentage of companies 
reporting underperformance rose from 52.63 percent between 1988 and 1990 to 84.85 
percent between 1995 and 1998. Furthermore, the cross-sectional patterns exhibit a 
similar tendency to the patterns reported for Germany: there is a clear tendency for IPOs 
with higher initial returns and higher ownership retention rate to do better in the long-
run.  Finally, the low number of New Economy IPOs, which has been identified as the 
main driver behind the relatively favourable IPO performance in other countries, can 
explain the strong average and median underperformance of Italian IPOs.18 
 
 
                                                 
18 During the early 1990s, a number of Italian companies such as Luxoticca Group, an eye-ware company, 
pursued their IPO on a foreign exchange, such as on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).  Some of 
these shares substantially outperformed the market in the long-run.  
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 Table VI 
Initial Returns and the Long-Run Performance of French IPOs 
Descriptive statistics for the initial and long-run performance of French IPOs, categorized by IPO year, 
sector, age, size, Public Float (%) and initial return (%). New Economy firms belong to Market Sectors 5, 
13, 16 and 17, representing Technology, Media, Telecommunication and Healthcare, respectively, in the 
attached Dow Jones STOXX global sector classification standard. Old Economy firms belong to all other 
sectors. Age is the year of going public minus the year of foundation, with firms founded before 1901 
assumed to be founded in 1901. Size/Market Capitalization in FRF billions is the number of shares issued 
times the final offer price (expressed in constant end-1998 prices). Long-run returns are measured as 
mean three-year buy-and-hold returns (ex. the initial return) whereas three-years is defined as 36 
consecutive 21-day trading intervals after the first close using local trading days. For example, for the 
oldest age category, the Wealth Relative of 0.721 is computed as 1.0863/1.5059.  
Panel A: Initial Returns  
Category    N Mean Median Standard Deviation S.E. 
Percentage 
negative 
IPO year 1988-1990 37 0.0759a 0.0769 0.08 (0.0136) 0.00 
IPO year 1991-1994 60 0.0869a 0.0323 0.13 (0.0169) 3.33
IPO year 1995-1998 226 0.1413a 0.0880 0.21 (0.0138) 8.41
New Economy 102 0.1533a 0.1000 0.22 (0.0216) 5.88 
Old Economy 221 0.1100a 0.0556 0.17 (0.0114) 6.79
Age < 15 168 0.1299a 0.0698 0.21 (0.0165) 9.52 
15 ≤  Age < 37 105 0.1352a 0.0833 0.17 (0.0166) 1.90
Age ≥  37 50 0.0785a 0.0398 0.10 (0.0143) 6.00
Small firms  (<0.33bn) 186 0.1236a 0.0790 0.20 (0.0145) 8.60 
Medium firms (0.33-1.65bn) 101 0.1352a 0.0789 0.18 (0.0181) 0.99
Large firms  (>1.65bn) 36 0.0922a 0.0286 0.14 (0.0236) 11.11
Public Float < 20 183 0.1216a 0.0827 0.16 (0.0115) 2.19 
20 ≤  Public Float < 30 73 0.1452a 0.0769 0.23 (0.0272) 12.33
30 ≤  Public Float < 50 58 0.1159a 0.0260 0.22 (0.0292) 12.07
Public Float  ≥  50 9 0.0422a 0.0000 0.08 (0.0264) 11.11
All IPOs 323 0.1237a 0.0714 0.19 (0.0104) 6.50 
Panel B: Long-Run Performance  
Category    N IPO return SBF 250 Index return 
Wealth 
Relative S.E. 
Percentage 
negative 
IPO year 1988-1990 37 -0.0879 0.0369 0.880 (0.0800) 59.46 
IPO year 1991-1994 60 0.4750 0.3190 1.118 (0.1381) 60.00 
IPO year 1995-1998 116 0.7682 1.1899 0.807 (0.2603) 74.14 
New Economy 64 1.0565 0.8161 1.132 (0.4293) 64.06 
Old Economy 149 0.3137 0.7134 0.767a (0.1049) 69.13 
Age < 15 102 0.6181 0.7993 0.899 (0.2704) 70.59 
15 ≤  Age < 37 71 0.6740 0.7995 0.930 (0.1961) 60.56 
Age ≥  37 40 0.0863 0.5059 0.721a (0.1560) 72.50 
Small firms  (<0.33bn) 112 0.6933 0.8729 0.904 (0.2603) 68.75 
Medium firms (0.33-1.65bn) 70 0.2771 0.6367 0.780b (0.1456) 68.57 
Large firms  (>1.65bn) 31 0.5583 0.5226 1.023 (0.1983) 61.29 
Public Float < 20  133 0.4450 0.6391 0.882 (0.1252) 63.91 
20 ≤  Public Float < 30 43 1.1452 0.8571 1.155 (0.6002) 69.77 
30 ≤  Public Float < 50 32 0.1451 1.0262 0.565a (0.2214) 81.25 
Public Float  ≥  50 5 0.2576 0.7676 0.711 (0.3446) 60.00 
Initial Return ≤  0  67 0.3856 0.6792 0.825 (0.1790) 73.13 
0 <  Initial Return < 7 39 1.1740 0.7888 1.215 (0.5926) 58.97 
7 ≤  Initial Return < 20 64 0.5543 0.7078 0.910 (0.2437) 62.50 
Initial Return  ≥  20 43 0.1688 0.8597 0.628a (0.2014) 74.42 
All IPOs (Mean) 213 0.5369 0.7443 0.881 (0.1481) 67.61 
All IPOs (Median) 213 0.631   
a,b,c denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on a simple t-test.  
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 Table VII 
Initial Returns and the Long-Run Performance of Italian IPOs 
Descriptive statistics for the initial and long-run performance of Italian IPOs, categorized by IPO year, 
sector, age, size, Public Float (%) and initial return (%). New Economy firms belong to Market Sectors 5, 
13, 16 and 17, representing Technology, Media, Telecommunication and Healthcare, respectively, in the 
attached Dow Jones STOXX global sector classification standard. Old Economy firms belong to all other 
sectors. Age is the year of going public minus the year of foundation, with firms founded before 1901 
assumed to be founded in 1901. Size/Market Capitalization in ITL billions is the number of shares issued 
times the final offer price (expressed in constant end-1998 prices). Long-run returns are measured as 
mean three-year buy-and-hold returns (ex. the initial return) whereas three-years is defined as 36 
consecutive 21-day trading intervals after the first close using local trading days. For example, for the 
oldest age category, the Wealth Relative of 0.772 is computed as 1.2200/1.5794.  
Panel A: Initial Returns  
Category  N Mean Median  Standard Deviation S.E. 
Percentage 
negative 
IPO year 1988-1990 21 0.2709b 0.1220 0.49 (0.1067) 28.57 
IPO year 1991-1994 9 -0.0051 0.0000 0.11 (0.0364) 44.44
IPO year 1995-1998 47 0.0934a 0.0602 0.13 (0.0186) 12.77
New Economy 5 0.2197b 0.1010 0.21 (0.0959) 0.00 
Old Economy 72 0.1241a 0.0535 0.29 (0.0344) 22.22
Age < 15 31 0.1630b 0.0500 0.36 (0.0655) 25.81 
15 ≤  Age < 37 30 0.1141a 0.0842 0.16 (0.0301) 13.33
Age ≥  37 16 0.0976 0.0236 0.31 (0.0781) 25.00
Small firms  (<100bn) 9 0.2368b 0.0889 0.35 (0.1178) 22.22 
Medium firms (100-500bn) 46 0.1400a 0.0551 0.32 (0.0473) 21.74
Large firms  (>500bn) 22 0.0665b 0.0582 0.14 (0.0308) 18.18
Public Float < 20 6 -0.0099 -0.0062 0.06 (0.0254) 50.00 
20 ≤  Public Float < 30 34 0.1848a 0.0996 0.39 (0.0677) 17.65
30 ≤  Public Float < 50 30 0.1225a 0.0792 0.16 (0.0297) 16.67
Public Float ≥  50 7 0.0194 0.0081 0.08 (0.0313) 28.57
All IPOs 77 0.1303a 0.0593 0.29 (0.0327) 20.78 
Panel B:  Long-Run Performance  
Category  N IPO return  MIB Index return 
Wealth 
Relative S.E. 
Percentage 
negative 
IPO year 1988-1990 19 -0.0510 -0.1253 1.085 (0.1486) 52.63 
IPO year 1991-1994 7 -0.4778 0.1734 0.445a (0.1784) 100.00
IPO year 1995-1998 33 0.4515 1.2365 0.649a (0.1554) 84.85 
New Economy 4 0.1748 0.6421 0.715b (0.1840) 100.00 
Old Economy 55 0.2429 1.0807 0.597a (0.2126) 74.55 
Age < 15 22 0.1325 0.7108 0.662a (0.1711) 81.82 
15 ≤  Age < 37 25 0.2013 0.6819 0.714b (0.2081) 76.00 
Age ≥  37 12 0.2200 0.5794 0.772b (0.1687) 75.00 
Small firms  (<100bn) 6 0.2846 0.8721 0.686 (0.6386) 83.33 
Medium firms (100-500bn) 36 0.0342 0.6644 0.621a (0.1102) 75.00 
Large firms  (>500bn) 17 0.4500 0.6168 0.897 (0.2224) 76.47 
Public Float < 20  6 0.5385 0.7328 0.888 (0.1304) 66.67 
20 ≤  Public Float < 30 27 0.0619 0.3671 0.777c (0.1806) 70.37 
30 ≤  Public Float < 50 20 0.3064 0.9974 0.654a (0.1963) 80.00 
Public Float ≥  50 6 -0.0740 0.8972 0.488a (0.2416) 100.00 
Initial Return ≤  0  14 -0.0176 0.4736 0.667a (0.1178) 85.71 
0 <  Initial Return < 7 15 0.2303 0.8849 0.653b (0.2547) 80.00 
7 ≤  Initial Return < 20 15 0.2635 0.9203 0.658a (0.1747) 73.33 
Initial Return ≥  20 15 0.2284 0.3953 0.880 (0.2980) 66.67 
All IPOs (Mean) 59 0.1794 0.6718 0.705a (0.1127) 76.27 
All IPOs (Median) 59 0.669   
a,b,c denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on a simple t-test.  
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 B.4. The Netherlands 
 
In Table VIII, we present evidence concerning the performance of Dutch IPOs. 
There is significant underpricing that depends on either the market condition at the time 
of going public or the sector. Only 8.00 percent of the IPOs recorded negative 
unadjusted initial returns. The long-run performance picture is similar to the one 
reported for Germany: On average, IPOs have overperformed the market. This 
overperformance is driven by New Economy stocks, which make up 31 percent of the 
sample. While an investment in the sample of New Economy IPOs leaves the average 
investor with Dutch Guilder (NLG) 1.373 relative to each NLG invested in the CBS 
Index over three years, an investment in Old Economy IPOs leaves the average investor 
with only 0.868 NLG relative to each NLG invested in the CBS Index. There is also a 
positive link between offering retention, initial return and long-run performance. We 
also note that, unlike for Italy, the average and median IPO long-run performance is 
clearly different, thus underlying the higher probability of finding extremely positive 
returns in New Economy IPOs, which made up a large percentage of IPOs. Of all the 
companies, 66.04 percent recorded negative long-run market adjusted performance, a 
result similar to the one presented for Germany and France.      
 
B.5. Spain 
 
We report the results for IPOs issued on the Madrid Stock Exchange in Table IX. 
The findings are similar to the one presented for IPOs issued on the Milan Stock 
Exchange. There is significant underpricing which is higher in rising stock markets than 
in stable and falling stock markets. For the sample as a whole, 7.95 percent recorded 
negative returns based on the closing price after the first day of trading. Companies 
from Old Economy sectors dominate the Spanish IPO market during the sample period. 
Less than four percent of companies are from New Economy sectors. When evaluating 
aftermarket performance, we can clearly distinguish between two periods: First, a 
period up to 1990, in which IPOs substantially underperform the market. This period is 
characterised by regulatory changes following the Spanish Securities Market Reform 
Act of 1989. Over three years, a strategy of investing in the sample of Spanish IPOs 
between 1988 and 1990 would have left the average investor with only Spanish Pesetas 
(ESP) 0.755 relative to each ESP invested in the Madrid General Index (IGBM).  
Second, the period from 1991 and 1998 was characterized by subdued IPO activity and 
generally a more favourable long-run performance picture of the companies going 
public. The results also confirm the signaling role of underpricing for the Spanish IPO 
market. Looking at the sample as a whole, the mean and median long-run performance 
of Spanish IPO is dismal, with 82.35 percent of companies underperforming the market 
benchmark. This could be partly due to the absence of IPOs in New Economy sectors.  
 
B.6. Sweden 
 
In Table X, we display the results for the initial and long-run performance of 
Swedish IPOs. The overall long-run performance of Swedish IPOs was mixed with 
71.72 percent of the IPOs underperforming the market after three years. Without IPOs 
in New Economy sectors, the average long-run IPO performance would have been 
dismal. The 148 Swedish IPOs record an average underpricing of 18.46 percent, with 
13.51 percent trading in negative territory based on their first close. Underpricing was 
highest between 1988 and 1990. None of the  26 IPOs between 1988 and  1990 recorded 
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 Table VIII 
Initial Returns and the Long-Run Performance of Dutch IPOs 
Descriptive statistics for the initial and long-run performance of Dutch IPOs, categorized by IPO year, 
market sector, age, size, Public Float (%) and initial return (%). New Economy firms belong to Sectors 5, 
13, 16 and 17, representing Technology, Media, Telecommunication and Healthcare, respectively, in the 
attached Dow Jones STOXX global sector classification standard. Old Economy firms belong to all other 
sectors. Age is the year of going public minus the year of foundation, with firms founded before 1901 
assumed to be founded in 1901. Size/Market Capitalization in NLG millions is the number of shares 
issued times the final offer price (expressed in constant end-1998 prices). Long-run returns are measured 
as mean three-year buy-and-hold returns (ex. the initial return) whereas three-years is defined as 36 
consecutive 21-day trading intervals after the first close using local trading days. For example, for the 
oldest age category, the Wealth Relative of 0.829 is computed as 1.4695/1.7722.  
Panel A: Initial Returns  
Category  N Mean  Median  Standard Deviation S.E. 
Percentage 
negative 
IPO year 1988-1990 17 0.0644a 0.0250 0.09 (0.0224) 21.43 
IPO year 1991-1994 11 0.0116a 0.0068 0.01 (0.0038) 0.00
IPO year 1995-1998 47 0.1888a 0.0780 0.26 (0.0384) 6.38
New Economy 30 0.1964a 0.0479 0.29 (0.0521) 3.33 
Old Economy 45 0.0934 0.0317 0.16 (0.0241) 11.11
Age < 15 27 0.1683a 0.0828 0.25 (0.0471) 7.41 
15 ≤  Age < 37 27 0.1641a 0.0741 0.26 (0.0503) 3.70
Age ≥  37 21 0.0534a 0.0239 0.09 (0.0204) 14.29
Small firms  (<113m) 17 0.2117a 0.0828 0.30 (0.0730) 11.76 
Medium firms (113-550m) 31 0.1156a 0.0263 0.24 (0.0428) 12.90
Large firms  (>550m) 27 0.1079a 0.0590 0.13 (0.0245) 0.00
Public Float < 20 20 0.1441a 0.0323 0.24 (0.0538) 5.00 
20 ≤  Public Float < 30 13 0.2021b 0.0250 0.34 (0.0949) 15.38
30 ≤  Public Float < 50 20 0.1349a 0.0683 0.21 (0.0465) 5.00
Public Float  ≥ 50 22 0.0859a 0.0345 0.12 (0.0248) 9.09
All IPOs 75 0.1346a 0.0333 0.22 (0.0259) 8.00 
Panel B:  Long-Run Performance  
Category  N IPO return CBS Index return  
Wealth 
Relative S.E. 
Percentage 
negative 
IPO year 1988-1990 17 0.0296 0.1844 0.869 (0.4074) 57.89 
IPO year 1991-1994 11 0.4455 0.7175 0.842 (0.2495) 77.78
IPO year 1995-1998 25 1.3460 0.9670 1.193 (0.5493) 68.00
New Economy 17 1.4789 0.8056 1.373 (0.6412) 58.82 
Old Economy 36 0.3865 0.5974 0.868 (0.2268) 69.44
Age < 15 18 1.1299 0.6651 1.279 (0.5884) 50.00 
15 ≤  Age < 37 18 0.5964 0.5613 1.022 (0.3191) 77.78
Age ≥  37 17 0.4695 0.7722 0.829 (0.1978) 70.59
Small firms  (<113m) 12 1.1578 0.3696 1.575 (0.5186) 33.33 
Medium firms (113-550m) 18 0.2512 0.6354 0.765c (0.1991) 72.22
Large firms  (>550m) 23 0.8974 0.8405 1.031 (0.5690) 78.26
Public Float < 20  16 1.8536 0.6981 1.680 (0.7089) 56.25 
20 ≤  Public Float < 30 8 0.4678 0.3716 1.070 (0.1503) 37.50
30 ≤  Public Float < 50 13 0.0001 0.6100 0.621b (0.2401) 84.62
Public Float ≥  50 16 0.3533 0.8206 0.743b (0.1877) 75.00
Initial Return  ≤  0  11 0.3486 0.3945 0.967 (0.2869) 54.55 
0 <  Initial Return < 7 21 0.6089 0.7589 0.915 (0.3061) 76.19
7 ≤  Initial Return < 20 9 0.1234 0.4853 0.756 (0.3067) 77.78
Initial Return  ≥  20 12 1.7769 0.8799 1.477 (0.8881) 50.00
All IPOs (Mean) 53 0.7369 0.6642 1.044 (0.2796) 66.04 
All IPOs (Median) 53 0.737   
a,b,c denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on a simple t-test.  
a
 27
 Table IX 
Initial Returns and the Long-Run Performance of Spanish IPOs 
Descriptive statistics for the initial and long-run performance of Spanish IPOs, categorized by IPO year, 
sector, age, size, Public Float (%) and initial return (%). New Economy firms belong to Market Sectors 5, 
13, 16 and 17, representing Technology, Media, Telecommunication and Healthcare, respectively, in the 
attached Dow Jones STOXX global sector classification standard. Old Economy firms belong to all other 
sectors. Age is the year of going public minus the year of foundation, with firms founded before 1901 
assumed to be founded in 1901. Size/Market Capitalization in ESP billions is the number of shares issued 
times the final offer price (expressed in constant end-1998 prices). Long-run returns are measured as 
mean three-year buy-and-hold returns (ex. the initial return) whereas three-years is defined as 36 
consecutive 21-day trading intervals after the first close using local trading days. For example, for the 
oldest age category, the Wealth Relative of 0.696 is computed as 0.9510/1.3659.  
Panel A: Initial Returns  
Category      N Mean Median  Standard Deviation S.E. 
Percentage 
negative 
IPO year 1988-1990 46 0.1650a 0.0835 0.24 (0.0350) 2.17 
IPO year 1991-1994 18 0.0064 0.0128 0.10 (0.0237) 27.78
IPO year 1995-1998 24 0.2197a 0.0853 0.29 (0.0600) 4.17
New Economy 3 0.3182b 0.3165 0.26 (0.1515) 0.00 
Old Economy 85 0.1414a 0.0764 0.24 (0.0263) 8.24
Age < 15 14 0.1146a 0.0590 0.12 (0.0318) 0.00 
15 ≤  Age < 37 38 0.1821a 0.1055 0.28 (0.0454) 10.53
Age ≥  37 36 0.1237a 0.0646 0.24 (0.0400) 8.33
Small firms  (<7bn) 14 0.1691b 0.0680 0.31 (0.0833) 0.00 
Medium firms (7-33bn) 45 0.1577a 0.0764 0.26 (0.0387) 8.89
Large firms  (>33bn) 29 0.1211a 0.0797 0.18 (0.0335) 10.34
Public Float < 20 11 0.0887b 0.0444 0.14 (0.0411) 0.00 
20 ≤  Public Float < 30 18 0.1001a 0.0799 0.15 (0.0358) 11.11
30 ≤  Public Float < 50 40 0.1478a 0.1150 0.18 (0.0284) 10.00
Public Float  ≥ 50 19 0.2258b 0.0716 0.42 (0.0961) 5.26
All IPOs 88 0.1475a 0.0781 0.24 (0.0260) 7.95 
Panel B: Long-Run Performance  
Category      N IPO return  IGBM Index return  
Wealth 
Relative S.E. 
Percentage 
negative 
IPO year 1988-1990 37 -0.4826 -0.1255 0.592a (0.0589) 81.08 
IPO year 1991-1994 14 0.0977 0.4334 0.766a (0.1190) 85.71
IPO year 1995-1998 17 0.7840 0.9658 0.907 (0.4545) 82.35
New Economy 2 -0.0367 0.2806 0.752 (0.5202) 50.00 
Old Economy 66 -0.3705 -0.3362 0.948a (0.0133) 83.33
Age < 15 11 -0.0651 0.1044 0.847 (0.3027) 72.73 
15 ≤  Age < 37 30 -0.0375 0.2272 0.784 (0.2282) 86.67
Age ≥  37 27 -0.0490 0.3659 0.696a (0.1137) 81.48
Small firms  (<7bn) 12 0.2739 0.1981 1.063 (0.5414) 75.00 
Medium firms (7-33bn) 32 -0.1721 0.2408 0.667a (0.1449) 84.38
Large firms  (>33bn) 24 -0.0393 0.3233 0.726a (0.0841) 83.33
Public Float < 20  10 0.3279 0.4430 0.920 (0.1265) 70.00 
20 ≤  Public Float < 30 14 -0.2643 0.1337 0.649b (0.1723) 78.57
30 ≤  Public Float < 50 29 -0.2775 0.0954 0.660a (0.1147) 89.66
Public Float  ≥ 50 15 0.3537 0.5851 0.854 (0.4722) 80.00
Initial Return ≤  0  12 -0.4100 0.0831 0.545a (0.0736) 91.67 
0 <  Initial Return < 7 18 -0.0001 0.3215 0.757a (0.1157) 72.22
7 ≤  Initial Return < 20 18 -0.3256 0.2322 0.547a (0.1007) 94.44
Initial Return  ≥  20 20 0.3810 0.3441 1.027 (0.3690) 75.00
All IPOs (Mean) 68 -0.0465 0.2624 0.755a (0.1193) 82.35 
All IPOs (Median) 68 0.553   
a,b,c denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on a simple t-test.  
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 Table X 
Initial Returns and the Long-Run Performance of Swedish IPOs 
Descriptive statistics for the initial and long-run performance of Swedish IPOs, categorized by IPO year, 
sector, age, size, Public Float (%) and initial return (%). New Economy firms belong to Market Sectors 5, 
13, 16 and 17, representing Technology, Media, Telecommunication and Healthcare, respectively, in the 
attached Dow Jones STOXX global sector classification standard. Old Economy firms belong to all other 
sectors. Age is the year of going public minus the year of foundation, with firms founded before 1901 
assumed to be founded in 1901. Size/Market Capitalization in SEK billions is the number of shares issued 
times the final offer price (expressed in constant end-1998 prices). Long-run returns are measured as 
mean three-year buy-and-hold returns (ex. the initial return) whereas three-years is defined as 36 
consecutive 21-day trading intervals after the first close using local trading days. For example, for the 
oldest age category, the Wealth Relative of 1.070 is computed as 1.8417/1.7211.  
Panel A: Initial Returns  
Category  N Mean  Median  Standard Deviation S.E. 
Percentage 
negative 
IPO year 1988-1990 26 0.2618a 0.1755 0.23 (0.0457) 0.00 
IPO year 1991-1994 41 0.1178a 0.0568 0.21 (0.0334) 21.95
IPO year 1995-1998 81 0.1937a 0.0846 0.32 (0.0358) 13.58
New Economy 55 0.2629a 0.1474 0.29 (0.0390) 5.45 
Old Economy 93 0.1383a 0.0714 0.27 (0.0281) 18.28
Age < 15 76 0.1997a 0.0961 0.27 (0.0306) 13.16 
15 ≤  Age < 37 33 0.1752a 0.1000 0.22 (0.0377) 3.03
Age ≥  37 39 0.1634a 0.0500 0.36 (0.0577) 23.08
Small firms  (<0.4bn) 84 0.2204a 0.1027 0.32 (0.0346) 11.90 
Medium firms (0.4-2.0bn) 48 0.1232a 0.0508 0.21 (0.0304) 18.37
Large firms  (>2.0bn) 16 0.1810a 0.0902 0.27 (0.0680) 6.67
Public Float < 20 26 0.2407a 0.1841 0.22 (0.0434) 7.69 
20 ≤  Public Float < 30 37 0.3278a 0.1446 0.41 (0.0676) 2.70
30 ≤  Public Float < 50 42 0.1361a 0.0823 0.23 (0.0354) 16.67
Public Float  ≥  50 43 0.0750a 0.0500 0.15 (0.0225) 23.26
All IPOs 148 0.1846a 0.0866 0.28 (0.0233) 13.51 
Panel B:  Long-Run Performance  
Category  N IPO return AFG Index return  
Wealth 
Relative S.E. 
Percentage 
negative 
IPO year 1988-1990 22 -0.2906 -0.0289 0.731a (0.0798) 77.27 
IPO year 1991-1994 32 0.4835 0.9123 0.776 a (0.1218) 81.25
IPO year 1995-1998 45 1.4020 1.1286 1.128 (0.3695) 62.22
New Economy 30 1.5212 0.9592 1.287 (0.4887) 60.00 
Old Economy 69 0.3846 0.7329 0.799a (0.1231) 76.81
Age < 15 46 0.7928 0.8842 0.952 (0.2688) 69.57 
15 ≤  Age < 37 22 0.4368 0.7419 0.825 (0.2564) 77.27
Age ≥  37 31 0.8417 0.7211 1.070 (0.3446) 70.97
Small firms  (<0.4bn) 52 0.9782 0.7905 1.105 (0.3077) 69.23 
Medium firms (0.4-2.0bn) 35 0.4692 0.8851 0.779b (0.1677) 77.78
Large firms  (>2.0bn) 12 0.4071 0.6051 0.877 (0.1414) 63.64
Public Float < 20  19 1.2267 0.7956 1.240 (0.4899) 73.68 
20 ≤  Public Float < 30 24 0.4439 0.6520 0.874 (0.2020) 62.50
30 ≤  Public Float < 50 26 1.0572 0.9014 1.082 (0.5026) 65.38
Public Float  ≥  50 30 0.3575 0.8382 0.739a (0.1498) 83.33
Initial Return ≤  0  19 0.7819 1.1597 0.825 (0.3498) 84.21 
0 <  Initial Return < 7 24 0.3794 0.7821 0.774b (0.1927) 75.00
7 ≤  Initial Return < 20 26 0.9686 0.7319 1.137 (0.4552) 69.23
Initial Return  ≥  20 30 0.7676 0.6504 1.071 (0.3256) 63.33
All IPOs (Mean) 99 0.7290 0.8015 0.960 (0.1768) 71.72 
All IPOs (Median) 99 0.726   
a,b,c denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on a simple t-test.  
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 Table XI 
Initial Returns and the Long-Run performance of Swiss IPOs 
Descriptive statistics for the initial and long-run performance of Swiss IPOs, categorized by IPO year, 
sector, age, size, Public Float (%) and initial return (%). New Economy firms belong to Market Sectors 5, 
13, 16 and 17, representing Technology, Media, Telecommunication and Healthcare respectively in the 
attached Dow Jones STOXX global sector classification standard. Old Economy firms belong to all other 
sectors. Age is the year of going public minus the year of foundation, with firms founded before 1901 
assumed to be founded in 1901. Size/Market Capitalization in CHF millions is the number of shares 
issued times the final offer price (expressed in constant end-1998 prices). Long-run returns are measured 
as mean three-year buy-and-hold returns (ex. the initial return) whereas three-years is defined as 36 
consecutive 21-day trading intervals after the first close using local trading days. For example, for the 
oldest age category, the Wealth Relative of 0.835 is computed as 1.4691/1.7601.  
Panel A: Initial Returns  
Category N Mean   Median  Standard Deviation S.E. 
Percentage 
negative 
IPO year 1988-1990 10 0.0343 0.0149 0.07 (0.0216) 30.00 
IPO year 1991-1994 4 0.0908a 0.0882 0.07 (0.0349) 0.00
IPO year 1995-1998 29 0.1196a 0.0489 0.17 (0.0319) 10.34
New Economy 18 0.1444a 0.1169 0.16 (0.0387) 16.67 
Old Economy 25 0.0629b 0.0227 0.13 (0.0260) 12.00
Age < 15 17 0.0965b 0.0400 0.18 (0.0431) 23.53 
15 ≤  Age < 37 13 0.1120a 0.0765 0.10 (0.0264) 7.69
Age ≥  37 13 0.0829c 0.0194 0.16 (0.0451) 3.85
Small firms  (<80m) 6 0.0642b 0.0438 0.08 (0.0319) 0.00 
Medium firms (80-450m) 28 0.1235a 0.0529 0.17 (0.0329) 17.86
Large firms  (>450m) 9 0.0368c 0.0194 0.06 (0.0203) 11.11
Public Float < 20 2 0.0496c 0.0496 0.04 (0.0270) 0.00 
20 ≤  Public Float < 30 2 0.1301 0.1301 0.15 (0.1033) 0.00
30 ≤  Public Float < 50 10 0.1377b 0.0854 0.18 (0.0567) 0.00
Public Float  ≥  50 29 0.0841a 0.0375 0.15 (0.0271) 20.69
All IPOs 43 0.0971a 0.0400 0.15 (0.0228) 13.95 
Panel B:  Long-Run Performance  
Category N IPO return STM Index return   
   Wealth 
Relative S.E. 
Percentage 
negative 
IPO year 1988-1990 10 0.2754 0.1997 1.063 (0.3785) 70.00 
IPO year 1991-1994 4 0.8104 0.9888 0.910 (0.4351) 75.00
IPO year 1995-1998 17 0.6676 0.8422 0.905 (0.2459) 64.71
New Economy 12 0.7337 0.7534 0.989 (0.2814) 66.67 
Old Economy 19 0.4495 0.5910 0.911 (0.2398) 68.42
Age < 15 13 0.5727 0.6278 0.966 (0.3061) 69.23 
15 ≤  Age < 37 9 0.6309 0.5852 1.029 (0.2539) 55.56
Age ≥  37 9 0.4691 0.7601 0.835 (0.3932) 77.78
Small firms  (<80m) 6 -0.1098 0.4164 0.628c (0.2726) 83.33 
Medium firms (80-450m) 19 0.6779 0.6889 0.993 (0.2200) 63.16
Large firms  (>450m) 6 0.8539 0.7803 1.041 (0.5257) 66.67
Public Float < 20  1 -0.1579 0.2933 0.651 - 100.00 
20 ≤  Public Float < 30 1 0.9913 1.1113 0.943 - 100.00
30 ≤  Public Float < 50 8 1.1413 0.8974 1.129 (0.4435) 50.00
Public Float  ≥ 50 21 0.3515 0.5564 0.868 (0.2134) 71.43
Initial Return ≤  0  5 0.5664 0.4028 1.117 (0.4195) 80.00 
0 <  Initial Return < 7 15 0.5731 0.6100 0.977 (0.3075) 66.67
7 ≤  Initial Return < 20 6 0.7013 0.9044 0.893 (0.3627) 66.67
Initial Return  ≥   20 5 0.3415 0.7355 0.773 (0.4062) 60.00
All IPOs (Mean) 31 0.5595 0.6538 0.943 (0.1849) 67.74 
All IPOs (Median) 31 0.774  
a,b,c denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on a simple t-test.  
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 a negative initial return. This can be explained by the fact that underpricing up until 
1990 was driven by an incentive to replace salary increases by tax efficient capital 
gains. Another important feature of the Swedish IPO market is that 37 percent of 
Swedish IPOs during the sample period belong to the New Economy sectors, the 
highest compared to the other six countries in this study. Most of the New Economy 
stocks went public between 1995 and 1997, which is strongly apparent when dividing 
IPO performance by IPO year. For example, a strategy of investing in the basket of 
Swedish IPOs between 1991 and 1994 at the first closing price and then holding them 
over a three-year period, would have left the investor with only Swedish Krona (SEK) 
0.776 relative to each SEK invested in the AFG Index. In contrast, Swedish IPOs issued 
between 1995 and 1998 rose, on average, by 140.20 percent over three years while the 
AFG Index recorded a rise of 112.86 percent, a ratio of 1.128.  The results displayed in 
Table X also verify our previous observations that the magnitude of long-run 
performance is sensitive to the size of the public float and the degree of underpricing.   
 
B.7. Switzerland 
 
In Table XI, we present evidence concerning the performance of Swiss IPOs going 
public on the respective market segments of the SWX stock exchange between 1988 
and 1998. We cannot reject that Swiss IPOs were underpriced, on average, across the 
sample period. However, the recorded degree of underpricing is markedly lower than 
for other European countries across the sample period. An interesting feature of the 
Swiss IPO market is the large number of New Economy IPOs that drive both initial and 
long-run aftermarket returns. For the sample as a whole, we do not find significant long-
run underperformance. Of all the IPOs in the sample, 67.74 percent recorded negative 
market adjusted returns in the long-run, a number slightly lower than reported for other 
European countries. Owning to the small sample sizes, it is difficult to draw inferences 
about the explanatory power of cross-sectional characteristics and long-run aftermarket 
performance of Swiss IPOs. 
 
 
IV. Checks for the Robustness of Performance Differences 
  
In order to investigate the patterns in IPO performance across countries, we measure 
the significance of country-by-country performance differences. This analysis is 
performed for 21 country pairs for the sample as a whole and for IPOs categorized by 
the issuing characteristics identified above using the conventional two samples test for 
Mean Difference. Moreover, because the results may be biased because of the skewness 
of the return distributions, we perform further robustness checks using the 
nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test.   
In Table XII, we report the result for the significance of differences in initial returns. 
The findings confirm our earlier observation. While significantly higher underpricing of 
Swedish IPOs offered between 1988 and 1990 indicates the effect of underpricing as 
tax-efficient compensation of management, the large number of young companies going 
public during 1998 explains the significantly higher level of underpricing for German 
IPOs, when compared to their European counterparts. German and Swedish 
underpricing was particularly significantly different when compared to France. This 
underlines the effect of certain IPO mechanisms that are relatively unique to the French 
IPO market during the sample period. For other country pairs, the results do not indicate 
a significant difference in underpricing. 
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 Table XII 
Test for Significance of Initial Return Differences  
In each Panel, we measure whether the adjusted initial return performance in one country is significantly 
different from the adjusted long-run IPO performance in another country. This analysis is performed for 
21 country pairs using the conventional two samples test for Mean Difference and the nonparametric 
Wilcoxon rank sum test. The initial return (IR) is the percentage difference between the final offering 
price and the first-day closing price. Significance values correspond to p-values. 
Tests for significance of Initial Returns (IR) Differences 
Country IR Conventional two samples test for Mean Difference (p-value) 
  BD FR IT NL ES SD SW 
Germany (BD) 0.2566  0.0000 0.0348 0.0396 0.0489 0.1098 0.3690 
France (FR) 0.1237   0.8034 0.6613 0.3243 0.0059 0.3704 
Italy (IT) 0.1303    0.9185 0.6790 0.1764 0.4811 
Netherlands (NL) 0.1346     0.7282 0.1847 0.3288 
Spain (ES) 0.1475      0.3071 0.2158 
Sweden  (SD) 0.1846       0.0533 
Switzerland (SW) 0.0971        
Country IR Nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test (p-value) 
  BD FR IT NL ES SD SW 
Germany (BD) 0.2566  0.0296 0.0729 0.1044 0.6884 0.4381 0.0751 
France (FR) 0.1237   0.6488 0.9817 0.3350 0.0273 0.5481 
Italy (IT) 0.1303    0.7137 0.2950 0.0569 0.9172 
Netherlands (NL) 0.1346     0.3256 0.0466 0.6464 
Spain (ES) 0.1475      0.2960 0.1675 
Sweden  (SD) 0.1846       0.0295 
Switzerland (SW) 0.0971        
 
 
Findings for the significance in long-run performance differences between IPOs in 
the seven European countries under study are shown in Table XIII. Of the 21 country 
pairs, 17 do not indicate significant differences in long-run IPO performance. An 
exception is the sample of German IPOs, which, on average, have substantially 
outperformed French IPOs. Much like for Initial Returns, this is due to the favourable 
performance of German IPOs issued during the late 1990s. Italy ranks lowest in the 
long-run performance ranking. It substantially underperformed most of the other 
countries in the study, which, as argued earlier, is due to the lack of IPO activity in the 
New Economy sectors in this market.   
The analysis of cross-sectional results for the significance in performance 
differences across the seven European countries also helps to shed some more light on 
some of the cross-sectional findings reported earlier. While not reported separately, we 
also conduct significance tests by categorizing IPOs in each of the seven countries 
according to the issuing characteristic at the IPO date. We infer that the significantly 
negative performance of Spanish IPOs was an isolated event limited to IPOs issued 
between 1988 and 1990, a time when changes in Spains securities markets law 
facilitated the process of going public. Moreover, tests for New Economy IPOs indicate 
insignificant performance differences across countries. The same result applies when 
comparing the significance of performance differences of IPOs categorized by issuing 
characteristics such as Old Economy sector, oldest age category or largest size. 
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 Table XIII 
Test for Significance of Long-Run Return Differences   
In each Panel, we measure whether the adjusted long-run IPO performance in one country is significantly 
different from the adjusted long-run IPO performance in another country. This analysis is performed for 
21 country pairs using the conventional two-sample test for Mean Difference and the nonparametric 
Wilcoxon rank sum test.  Long-run returns are measured as broad-market adjusted mean three-year buy-
and-hold returns (BHRT) whereas three years is defined as 36 consecutive 21-day trading intervals using 
local trading days.  Significance values correspond to p-values. 
Tests for significance of Long-Run Performance (BHRT) Differences 
Country BHRT Conventional two samples test for Mean Difference (p-value) 
  BD FR IT NL ES SD SW 
Germany (BD) 0.9850  0.0664 0.1999 0.4667 0.2446 0.2550 0.5118 
France (FR) -0.2074   0.2293 0.3991 0.7086 0.5869 0.7753 
Italy (IT) -0.5584    0.0222 0.1441 0.0499 0.0305 
Netherlands (NL) 0.0649     0.1502 0.6480 0.6554 
Spain (ES) -0.3089      0.3116 0.3223 
Sweden  (SD) -0.0725       0.9471 
Switzerland (SW) -0.0943        
Country BHRT Nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test (p-value) 
  BD FR IT NL ES SD SW 
Germany (BD) 0.9850  0.0261 0.0158 0.6398 0.2611 0.2565 0.9098 
France (FR) -0.2074   0.5102 0.1872 0.4764 0.2786 0.1615 
Italy (IT) -0.5584    0.0908 0.2084 0.1383 0.0782 
Netherlands (NL) 0.0649     0.8345 0.7337 0.7386 
Spain (ES) -0.3089      0.9844 0.5043 
Sweden  (SD) -0.0725       0.4314 
Switzerland (SW) -0.0943        
 
 
As argued earlier, we also found a tendency for companies that retained the least at the 
IPO date to underperform the most in the long-run. Significance tests also confirm 
underperformance of companies with the highest public float at the IPO date. The result 
is not driven by one single country, but extends across all countries in this study. A 
slightly different picture emerges when categorizing long-run returns according to the 
initial returns category. While there is a clear tendency for companies with the lowest 
initial returns to perform similarly, French IPOs in the highest initial return category 
perform significantly worse. In this respect, the majority of all other IPOs in the 
countries do not show significant performance differences when compared to each 
other. This result is robust to both forms of statistical measurement used. For France, 
therefore, there is weak support for the signaling explanation of underpricing.  
In order to underline the sensitivity of our analysis to methodological choices such 
as returns measurement or benchmark choice and address the issue of country- versus 
sector-based analysis in Europe, we compare the results in this paper (country-by-
country analysis) versus the results in Schuster (2003) (pan-European approach). The 
results are displayed in the Appendix, Table AII, and indicate issues across two 
dimensions: First, in both studies, the results on monthly portfolio rebalancing (CARs) 
confirm that the use of buy-and-hold returns (BHRs) biases the long-run performance 
upwards, a findings consistent with Ritter (1991), Schuster (1996) or Teoh, Welch and 
Wong (1998). Second, while there is overall consistency in the findings on raw and 
adjusted returns   the slight difference being due to the use of a European versus Local 
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 Trading Day Calendar resulting in different sample sizes for returns measurement and 
the conversion of stock prices into Euro () when appropriate at the individual country 
level - the choice of a pan-European benchmark index versus a local benchmark index 
with a potentially large divergence in sector weightings has a clear influence on the 
results.   
 
 
V. Summary and Conclusion 
  
In this paper, we have analysed the short- and long-run performance of Initial Public 
Offerings (IPOs) in seven individual European countries between 1988 and 1998, a time 
characterized by a rapid change. In all countries, companies going public were 
significantly underpriced. Average initial returns are also related to age and the 
percentage of New Economy stocks of total IPO activity. In each country under study, 
there appears to be a close link between IPO activity, the level of underpricing and the 
general level of the stock market. Moreover, the results point to the effects of tax 
incentives (in the case of Sweden or France), the IPO mechanism (in the case of France) 
and changes in the regulatory environment (in the case of Spain) on the level of 
underpricing and IPO activity.  
The long-run aftermarket performance of IPOs issued in the seven European 
countries is mixed. We find that a strategy of investing in IPOs at the end of the first 
day of trading, and holding them over a three-year period, would have left the investor 
in German IPOs with DM1.701 relative to each DM invested in the FAZ Index, and the 
investor in Dutch IPOs with NLG1.044 relative to each NLG invested in the CBS 
Index. Investors in other countries would have underperformed the market: the investor 
in Swedish IPOs would have been left with only SEK0.960 to each SEK invested in the 
AFG Index, the investor in Swiss IPOs would have been left with CHF0.943 relative to 
each CHF invested in the STM Index, and the investor in French IPOs with FRF0.881 
relative to each FRF invested in the SBF 250 Index. Spanish and Italian IPOs fared the 
worst: an investment in the sample of Spanish IPOs resulted in ESP0.755 for each ESP 
invested in the IGBM Index after three years. The investor in Italian IPOs would have 
been left with only ITL0.705 for each ITL invested in the MIB Historical Index over 
three years.  
We have also shown that aftermarket performance is sensitive to benchmark 
adjustment and return methodology. In the countries under study, returns on IPOs were 
more favourable when adjusted for movements in small- or mid-cap indices, when 
available. We also found that the use of cumulative average returns (CARs) results in a 
more negative long-run performance picture when compared to buy-and-hold returns 
(BHRs). An analysis of CARs of German, Dutch and Swedish IPOs indicates strong 
overperformance during the first months on the stock market.  Capturing the positive 
returns in the countries faring best depends on the investors ability of finding the 
extreme winner. This describes the essence of the IPO market.   
For each individual country, we have also documented various cross-sectional 
patterns  in  long-run  performance  by segmenting IPOs according to a number of 
issuing characteristics. When categorizing performance according to the public float at 
the IPO date, for example, we find that companies retaining the least amount of equity 
at the IPO date perform particularly poorly. We also show that the relatively favourable 
average return picture is driven by the outperformance of IPOs in sectors representing 
the New Economy. This applies to Germany, France, The Netherlands, Sweden and 
Switzerland, the five countries with significant New Economy IPO activity during the 
 34
 sample period. Stock exchanges in countries that did not manage to cater to companies 
in New Economy sectors during the sample period via New Market segments, such as 
Italy or Spain, did the worst. Moreover, the poor performance of Old Economy IPOs 
relative to the market and their New Economy peers is not an isolated event as it 
extends to all countries under study. Significance tests of performance differences 
indicate broad similarity in underpricing and long-run return behaviour of IPOs in the 
seven countries under study, which underlines the homogeneity of the European IPO 
market and the pervasiveness of the reported long-run IPO patterns. 
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  Table AI 
Listing Requirements on European Market Segments 
These minimum listing requirements were in effect during 2001 and are also broadly applicable to the study period between 1988 and 1998. The number in parenthesis 
corresponds to the number of IPOs in the sample. This study does not include issues on the Italian Nuovo Mercato, Spanish Nuevo Mercado and SWX Swiss New 
Market. The Swedish New Market section includes IPOs going public on Aktietorget Norden AB and SBI AB.   
Minimum Listing Requirements on Alternative Market Segments: Germany (Stock exchange operator: Deutsche Börse AG) 
Amtlicher Handel (Official Market) (80 IPOs) Geregelter Markt (Official Parallel Market (89 IPOs) Neuer Markt (New Market) (50 IPOs) 
Company should have existed for at least three years; a min. 
of  25% of nominal equity must be offered to the market; 
turnover between 50-100m with min. nominal stockholder 
equity of   1.25m; at least 50,000 shares must be offered 
with gross proceeds exceeding 25m; no stringent 
requirement concerning the use of funds; issuance of 
different share classes possible; no retention obligation for 
existing shareholders; operates under public law; in addition 
to the annual financial statements, a minimum of one interim 
report covering the first six months of the financial year is 
required;  required to comply with ad-hoc publicity rules.  
No set requirements for size of free float and for the 
companys minimum age; min. amount of shares issued: 
10,000; companies going public usually have gross proceeds 
smaller than 25m and turnover smaller than 50-100m; the 
nominal stockholder equity must be at least 250,000; no 
stringent requirement concerning the use of funds; issuance 
of different share types possible; no set retention obligation 
for existing shareholders; operates under public law; in 
addition to the annual financial statements, a minimum of 
one interim report covering the first six months of the 
financial year is required; required to comply with ad-hoc 
publicity rules.  
Company should have existed for at least one year (recently 
changed to three years); min. expected market capitalization:  
5m; nominal stockholder equity: min. 250,000; number of 
shares for free float: min. 100,000; at least 25% of the shares 
widely held; at least 50% of the issue volume to be placed 
should originate from a capital increase; existing 
shareholders and issuer shall retain shares for the first six 
months following the IPO; established in 1997 to attract 
young, high growth companies; operates under private law; 
three quarterly reports per business year and one annual 
report are required;  required to comply with ad-hoc publicity 
rules.  
Minimum Listing Requirements on Alternative Market Segments: France (Stock exchange operator: SBF-Paris Bourse SA) 
Premier Marché  (Official Market) (21) Second Marché (Official Parallel Market) (231) Nouveau Marché (New Market) (71) 
Company must provide three years of certified consolidated 
statements; min. gross proceeds of 250m; at least 25% of 
the company must be publicly placed representing a min. of 
600,000 shares; company must provide quarterly updates 
and half-year results and one annual report; listing applicable 
to large, established French and Foreign companies. 
Company must provide certified consolidated accounts for 
the last two years prior to listing; min. size of the floatation 
between 10-20m; min. percentage of equity offered: 10%; 
company must provide quarterly updates and half-year 
results and one annual report; applicable to medium-sized 
companies (or large companies seeking an eventual listing 
on the Premier Marché); established in 1983. 
No min. operating history; min. nominal equity:  
250,000; min. no. of shares offered: 100,000 representing a 
float of at least 1.5m; for companies in existence of less 
than two years, offering must constitute a capital increase; 
management/personnel must keep 80% of shares for three 
years after the IPO; same reporting requirements as for other 
market segments; established in 1996. 
Minimum Listing Requirements on Alternative Market Segments: Italy (Stock exchange operator: Borsa Italiana SpA) 
Borsa Valori (Official Market) (70) Mercato Ristretto (Official Parallel Market) (7) Nuovo Mercato (New Market) (0) 
Company must provide three years of consolidated annual 
accounts; foreseeable market capitalization: at least 5m; 
may admit companies with lower market capitalization if 
deemed as adequate; min. public float: 25% of shares 
outstanding represented by shares of the same class.  
Issuer must carry on, directly or through its subsidiaries, an 
activity capable of generating revenues; a foreseeable market 
capitalisation of at least 500,000; adequate distribution 
presumed to exist where shares representing at least 20 % of 
the capital represented by shares of the same class are 
distributed among the public. 
Annual accounts published and filed for the last financial 
years; min. floatation: 20% of capital; min. nominal 
shareholder equity: 5m representing at least 100,000 shares; 
constant information and three quarterly financial reports; 
initial shareholders must keep 80% of their shares after 
quotation for one year; established in 1999.  
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 Table AI continued: 
Minimum Listing Requirements on Alternative Market Segments: Netherlands (Stock exchange operator: Amsterdam Exchanges NV) 
Officiële Markt (Official Market) (56) Officiële Parallel Markt (Official Parallel Market) (8) Nieuwe Markt (New Market) (11) 
Business run by the issuer must have a track record of at least 
three years; at the time of first admission at least three out of 
five issuers book years preceding such admission must have 
closed with a net profit; issuer capital must amount to at least  
5m; a min. of 10% of the capital placed must be available 
for trading; lock-up period: 180 days after the IPO.  
Applicable to Dutch IPOs from 1988-1993; min. nominal 
value of shareholder equity: NGL4m; min. gross proceeds for 
an IPO: NGL2.5m; since 1994 the Official Parallel Market is 
closed for IPOs.    
New economy stocks must have a track record of at least one 
year (other companies: three years); after admission to 
listing, at least 100,000 shares must be placed; tradable 
market value at least 5m; all listed companies are also 
required to satisfy the requirements that apply to the Official 
Market; quarterly figures and annual certified accounts; 
established in 1997. 
Minimum Listing Requirements on Alternative Market Segments: Spain (Stock exchange operator: Bolsa de Madrid SA) 
Primer Mercado (Official Market) (56) Segundo Mercado (Official Parallel Market) (32) Nuevo Mercado (New Market) (0) 
Provide audited financial statements for the three years prior 
to IPO; min. nominal shareholder equity:  1.5m, excluding 
stakes of 25% or more belonging to two shareholders; at least 
100 shareholders must own less than 25% of the capital; (in 
the last two years before IPO or in three of the last five years) 
must have distributed a dividend of 6% of its capital.  
Official prospectus has to be filed with the Spanish 
supervisory authority (CNMV); min. capital reserves of 
250,000; in addition, 20% of the capital should be available 
for trading in the market; a security issue prospectus must be 
presented and other administrative and legal certificates 
provided. 
Approved 1999, operational since 2000, to create a special 
trading section for innovative, high technology companies 
offering considerable future growth prospects, although at 
higher levels of risk than the traditional sectors; part of the 
continuous market, but subject to more information 
regulations than other market segments.  
Minimum Listing Requirements on Alternative Market Segments: Sweden (Stock exchange operator: OM Stockholm Exchanges AB) 
A-list (Official Market) (15) OTC-list (Official Parallel Market) (52) O-list (New Market) (81) 
Must have at least three years of verifiable history and 
possess documented profit earning capacity; have at least 
2,000 shareholders; possess an ownership structure under 
which at least 25% of the equities in the company and 10% of 
the votes are owned by the general public; min. market value: 
SEK 300m; approval must be obtained from the Swedish 
Financial Supervisory Authority; dual class shares common.  
Must have at least three years of verifiable history and 
possess documented profit earning capacity; have at least 500 
shareholders; possess an ownership structure under which at 
least 25% of the equity in the company and 10% of the votes 
are owned by the general public; have a market value of at 
least SEK50m; approval must be obtained from the Swedish 
Financial Supervisory Authority. 
No history and profit-earning capability requirement; 
required: at least 300 shareholders and an ownership 
structure under which at least 10% of the equity in the 
company and 10% of the votes are owned by the general 
public; approval granted by the Swedish Financial 
Supervisory Authority; dual class shares common (low 
voting B shares and high voting A shares).  
Minimum Listing Requirements on Alternative Market Segments: Switzerland  (Stock exchange operator: SWX Swiss Exchange AG) 
SWX Hauptsegment (Official Market) (35) SWX Nebensegment (Official Parallel Market) (8) SWX New Market (New Market) (0) 
Issuer must present audited accounts covering three complete 
financial years; issuer must have a min. nominal equity of  
CHF25m; at least 25% of shares must be floated publicly; 
sustained or expected capitalisation of at least CHF25m; no 
set rules on lock-up periods for insiders; price sensitive facts 
and relevant company events must be disclosed; reports must 
be provided annually with semi-annual updates.   
Applicable to Swiss IPOs issued during 1988; min. nominal 
value of shareholder equity: CHF1m; min. gross proceeds: 
CHF2.5m; applicable to small- and medium-sized companies. 
Shareholders equity must amount to at least CHF2.5m; min. 
20% of the equity capital must be in diversified hands; total 
market cap: min. CHF8m; company must demonstrate an 
operating and financial track record extending over at least 
12 months before the IPO; account must be in IAS or US 
GAAP; lock-up period: six months following the IPO; the 
IPO must involve a capital increase of at least 50%.  
 38
 Table AII   
Comparative Results 
This table addresses the impact of using a country-by-country approach (this paper) versus sector-based 
approach by pooling the data (Schuster (2003)) to the analysis of the performance of European IPOs.  The 
main differences between the empirical methodologies are: 1) the use of a local trading day calendar (this 
paper) versus European trading day calendar (Schuster (2003)) resulting in a smaller sample size for the 
calculation of long-run returns (677 versus 686 companies), 2) the use of local currency unites (this 
paper) versus the conversion of stock prices into Euro (), when applicable (Schuster (2003)) and 3) the 
choice of national benchmark indices (this paper) versus pan-European benchmark indices (Schuster 
(2003)) for the adjustment of raw returns. Returns were calculated as Buy-and-Hold Returns (BHRs) and 
Cumulative Average Returns (CARs) from the close of the first day of trading to the three-year 
anniversary on the stock markets with one month defined as a 21-day-trading interval. In this table, 
returns are reported as raw returns (RAW) (no adjustment) and returns adjusted for movements in the 
broad market (ADJ). The national broad-market indices (this paper) and the Dow Jones Eurostoxx broad-
market index (Schuster (2003)) are used as benchmarks. The large difference in the RAW and ADJ 
returns using both return methodologies between Panel A and Panel B in French IPOs is due to additional 
four companies available for calculating three-year returns in Schuster (2003). When excluding those 
companies from calculation, the increase in French BHRs, amounts to 52.49 percent versus 47.80 
reported.  
 Panel A: Pan-European Study (Schuster (2003)) 
  Return Methodology 
  Buy-and-Hold Returns (BHRs) Cumulative Average Returns (CARs)
Country No % RAW S.E. ADJ S.E. RAW S.E. ADJ S.E. 
Germany 156 22.7 1.3654b (0.7206) 0.8872 (0.7159) 0.2279a (0.0447) -0.1557a (0.0572)
France 217 31.6 0.4780a (0.1337) -0.2135 (0.1326) 0.2892b (0.1210) -0.2511c (0.1525)
Italy 58 8.5 0.1789 (0.1119) -0.4470a (0.1009) 0.1161 (0.0974) -0.3758a (0.0910)
Netherlands 68 9.9 -0.0303 (0.1617) -0.4083a (0.1411) -0.1324 (0.0992) -0.4608a (0.1214)
Spain 55 8.0 0.7237a (0.2549) 0.1506 (0.2396) 0.3847a (0.1446) -0.0720 (0.0921)
Sweden 101 14.7 0.8281a (0.1997) 0.1515 (0.1870) 0.5293a (0.0961) 0.0048 (0.0594)
Switzerland 31 4.5 0.5616a (0.1997) -0.1296 (0.1949) 0.3756b (0.1566) -0.1730 (0.1330)
All 686 100.0 0.6791a (0.1746) 0.0844 (0.1729) 0.2658a (0.0376) -0.2052a (0.0349)
Panel B: Comparative Country-by-Country Study (this paper)) 
  Return Methodology 
  Buy-and-Hold Returns (BHRs) Cumulative Average Returns (CARs)
Country No % RAW S.E. ADJ S.E. RAW S.E. ADJ S.E. 
Germany 155 22.9 1.3892c (0.7369) 0.9850 (0.7318) 0.2301a (0.0448) -0.1166a (0.0439)
France 213 31.5 0.5369a (0.1490) -0.2074 (0.1483) 0.3717a (0.1413) -0.1901 (0.1388)
Italy 58 8.6 0.1794 (0.1171) -0.4924a (0.1050) 0.1104 (0.0940) -0.4185a (0.0918)
Netherlands 68 10.0 -0.0465 (0.2481) -0.3089c (0.1068) -0.1433 (0.1055) -0.3021a (0.0865)
Spain 53 7.8 0.7369a (0.2763) 0.0727 (0.2791) 0.3725a (0.1413) -0.1558 (0.1248)
Sweden 99 14.6 0.7290a (0.1887) -0.0725 (0.1747) 0.4786a (0.0916) -0.1270 (0.0789)
Switzerland 31 4.6 0.5595a (0.2014) -0.0943 (0.1840) 0.3510b (0.1479) -0.1817 (0.1378)
All 677 100.0 0.6888a (0.1802) 0.0616 (0.1786) 0.2762a (0.0387) -0.1973a (0.0340)
a,b,c denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on a simple t-test. 
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